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This thesis discusses the need for a change in perspective in Canadian innovation policy 
frameworks, explores the innovation ecosystems perspective and what it might add to public 
policy, and applies this perspective to investigate innovation in the mining, oil and gas extraction, 
and construction industries in Saskatchewan. The negative multifactor productivity (MFP) growth 
experienced in these industries over the last two decades suggests that these industries experience 
significant innovation challenges and public intervention may be merited. The study focuses on 
digital technology adoption as digital transformation will be key in overcoming several megatrends 
that threaten to disrupt Canada’s economy. The study is confined to firms in Saskatchewan for 
feasibility and because the industries of study represent a significant share of the provincial 
economy. Data was collected in 24 interviews with firms’ representatives. The results provide 
several directions for policy intervention in the three industries, some of which would not have 
been identified using conventional approaches. This is most evident for the construction industry 
where the prevalence of small firms, diversity of technology, and the need for simultaneous 
adoption of similar technology by many firms create significant financial, capacity, and 
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The generally accepted narrative among innovation scholars and public policymakers is 
that Canada excels in science but performs poorly in terms of innovation relative to other 
industrialized countries. Canada’s population has the highest proportion of post-secondary 
graduates in the world, and the country ranks in the top ten in terms of share of world publications, 
publications per capita, and the average relative citation index (Council of Canadian Academies 
2018, 24, 37, 39). However, traditional innovation indicators such as research and development 
(R&D) expenditures, investment in information communication technology (ICT) equipment, and 
multifactor productivity (MFP) growth are low relative to Canada’s peer countries and have been 
declining or stagnant for the last two decades (Council of Canadian Academies 2018; Sharpe and 
Tsang 2018). International competitiveness rankings regularly place Canada as middling to low 
relative to its peer countries in terms of overall innovation performance (Schwab 2017; 2019). 
Given the importance of innovation to long-term productivity growth, this seemingly low 
performance has raised concerns that Canada’s future economic well-being may be at risk. 
Yet, despite its seeming inability to capture significant returns from its robust science 
system, Canada’s economy has performed well as demonstrated by increasing GDP per capita and 
business profitability. Research suggests this is largely due to superior labour utilization and a 
strong trading relationship with the United States (Council of Canadian Academies 2013b; 
Nicholson 2018). However, Canada is facing four megatrends which threaten this benevolent 
status quo: an aging population; increasing globalization and competition; growing opposition to 
resource extraction practices and the development of substitutes; and rapid technological advances 
in ICT technologies that are creating a digital transformation in the economy (Nicholson 2016; 
2018). This last megatrend is especially significant because in addition to the challenges it creates, 
it has the potential to help address the challenges posed by the other three. But only if Canada can 
improve its innovation performance.  
There have been many policies at both the federal and provincial levels that have attempted 
to improve Canada’s science, technology, and innovation (STI) performance over the last century 
(Doern, Castle, and Phillips 2016; P. Phillips and Castle Submitted). The evidence would suggest 
these have been much more effective at improving the country’s science performance than its 
technology or innovation performance. A change in perspective in the innovation policy 




Canada’s performance, assuming that it is not already optimized.1 Innovation ecosystems is a 
concept that has received increasing attention in the last fifteen years (Adner 2006; Gomes et al. 
2018; Granstrand and Holgersson 2020). Though developed as a tool to help managers in the 
private sector formulate their business strategies, it emphasizes certain aspects of innovation that 
previous models did not, or not to the same extent. Whereas most of these models focused on 
system level factors, such as institutional supports, innovation ecosystems focuses on firms and 
gives more consideration to the role played by users and the demand side of innovation. The 
framework also puts reduced emphasis on geography, though it still firmly grounded in network 
concepts. Taking firms as the focal point of innovation policy suggests policies should be oriented 
toward addressing the specific challenges firms face rather than focusing solely on environmental 
or framework conditions. Building policy from the bottom up in this way can better account for 
differences between industries and potentially reveal challenges that top-down perspectives would 
not easily identify. With respect to the demand side of innovation, previous models, at least as they 
were applied in Canada, tended to focus on the creation of knowledge and the development of new 
technology, but tended to ignore the demand side of innovation which is concerned with innovation 
adoption and facilitating demand for innovation (Edler 2019). For innovation to be successful, 
both sides of the process must be supported. 
There is some evidence that the federal government is beginning to shift toward this 
perspective. The 2017 Budget introduced the Economic Strategy Tables, which were focused on 
needs of technological and industrial sectors, and Innovative Solutions Canada, The Supercluster 
Initiative, and several other policies that constitute a step toward demand-side policy (Government 
of Canada 2017). The Superclusters Initiative is also reflective of an innovation ecosystems 
perspective, much more so than the clusters perspective given the reduced emphasis on geography 
and its focus on creating linkages within and between firms (Beaudry and Solar-Pelletier 2020). 
But more is needed. As with the old policies, the new policies still have a strong focus on research, 
technology development, and commercialization, and only a limited focus on technology adoption 
and use. 
The goal of this project is to provide insights on how firms in industries that have 
traditionally been accepted as non-technologically intensive or low-innovation industries innovate. 
The conventional narrative is that these industries do not rely heavily on technology development 
 




as a business strategy but may be effective adopters. However, looking beyond the statistics and 
taking the perspective of the firm suggests this is a simplistic view. If policy instruments are to 
effectively support innovation, they must be based on an understanding of the challenges firms 
face in these industries both in how they conduct their business and in how they innovate. This 
project focuses on digital innovation in the mining, oil and gas extraction, and construction 
industries in Saskatchewan. The mining, and oil and gas extraction industries have had persistent 
negative MFP growth within the sector for the last two decades and construction has had negative 
MFP growth since 2010. Though most of Canada’s poor MFP growth can be explained by a 
slowdown in the manufacturing sector (Sharpe and Tsang 2018), the negative within-sector growth 
in these industries could be interpreted to suggest these industries face the most severe challenges 
when it comes to innovation. There is a limited body of literature that suggests otherwise, at least 
for the mining, and oil and gas extraction industries, and the qualitative findings of this study 
support the alternative view.  
A key concern is how firms in the industries of study engage with digital technologies and 
digital innovation. Digital transformation, a more comprehensive structural phenomenon based on 
digital innovation, is broadly believed by policymakers and innovation scholars to be key to 
increasing productivity growth and to addressing critical issues such as population aging and 
sustainability. Understanding barriers to adoption of these technologies may therefore produce 
immediate benefits for the industries as well as produce general insight on digital technology 
adoption in similar industries.  
The study takes place in Saskatchewan primarily for feasibility but has the added benefit 
that the industries of study account for a significant share of Saskatchewan’s economy. The 
province is also considered to have poor innovation performance in general (Conference Board of 
Canada 2020) and so the results of this study may therefore have immediate relevance to at least 
one government.  
This study was conducted using a series of semi-structured interviews with representatives 
of firms in the industries of study. Eligible firms did not have to be based in Saskatchewan but had 
to be operating in it. There were between 10 and 20 interviews collected for each industry, 
following the principle of saturation. The research questions for this project are: How do firms in 
the industries of study innovate? What challenges do they face in the business environment and 




they faced in adoption? Where do the ideas for innovation come from? Have firms taken advantage 
of existing innovation policies and what improvements or new supports would they like to see? 
The results identify several directions for future policy discussions and research. Firms in 
the mining and oil and gas extraction industries tend to be large with extensive resources, and are 
both developers and users of their digital innovations.  Though conventional supports such as those 
for R&D are well-suited to these industries, there are areas in which the public sector can provide 
further support. In mining, this may be through helping break down silos between research 
institutions, providing greater support for training and reskilling, and creating regulatory stability. 
In oil and gas extraction, the greatest role identified for the public sector was to provide 
complementary support for innovation by investing in communications infrastructure to support 
digital innovation. The approach used in this study excels in a setting like the construction industry 
where firms do not undertake much R&D and are primarily users of technological solutions 
developed elsewhere. The large variety of potential solutions was identified as a significant barrier 
to innovation as firms tend to be small and lack the resources necessary to identify which solutions 
they should adopt. In this case, institutions such as industry associations can provide support by 
doing research on behalf of firms and providing resources for firms to evaluate which technologies 
are most suitable. The public sector can support the ecosystem by investing in large infrastructure 
projects and using procurement to incentivize technology adoption, and reforming procurement 
platforms and implementing qualification regulations to reduce the burden on firms and incentivize 




2. Canada’s Innovation Problem: Challenges, Definition, and New Directions 
Despite its poor performance on 
traditional innovation indicators, Canada has 
maintained GDP per capita growth similar to 
that of the United States (Figure 2.1) and has 
experienced increased business profits over the 
last three decades (Figure 2.2). One explanation 
for this success is Canada’s close economic 
relationship with the world’s technological 
leader, the United States, and its superior 
utilization of relatively cheap labour. This has 
led Canada to fall into a profitable “low-
innovation” equilibrium (Nicholson 2016, S40-
S42; 2018, 15). However, there are four 
emerging megatrends which threaten to disrupt 
this profitable status quo: an aging population; 
increased competition from other countries and 
a shift of economic opportunity toward Asian 
states; increased opposition to resource 
extraction practices and a drive toward 
sustainability; and disruption caused by 
emerging digital technologies. 
 In 2017, Canada had the highest labour 
force participation rate in the G7 at 66 percent 
(Martel 2019, 4). However, the participation rate 
has been steadily declining as the population 
ages and more people retire than join the labour 
force. It is estimated that by 2036, the labour force participation rate will have declined to between 
61 percent and 63 percent with wide variation across regions (ibid.,4-5). This decrease in labour 
force participation is expected to be accompanied by increased demand for services, particularly 
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Figure 2.1: GDP per Capita (USD 2015, Constant Prices, 
Constant PPP) 




































































Figure 2.2: Business Profits as a percentage of Operating 
Revenue 




Canada’s prosperity in the past two decades has in fact depended upon its superior labour 
utilization relative to that of the United States, it will require increased labour productivity (GDP 
per worker) to offset the loss from a reduced labour force (Nicholson 2018, 23).  
 Canada’s economy is highly integrated with the United States. Its role is traditionally 
understood as largely to supply raw materials to American firms which transform them into 
finished products and sell them back to Canada and elsewhere. Many Canadian firms operate as 
subsidiaries to American firms (Nicholson 2016, S41). Overall this has been a profitable 
arrangement for Canadian firms who have reaped the benefits of close proximity, language, and 
business culture (Nicholson 2018, 21). However, as a result, Canadian firms have not had to 
develop a global trading perspective. Though this is changing, the shift in economic opportunity 
toward East Asia and increased competition from firms in that region as well as from Australia, 
Europe, and the United States threatens to put Canada at a disadvantage. The lack of Canadian 
multinational firms may also put it at a disadvantage when it comes to acquiring technologies 
emerging from new markets unless it is able to increase its ability to absorb such technologies 
(ibid., 21).  
 Canada has a strong comparative advantage in natural resources, but it faces two threats on 
this front. First, there is a growing public opposition to what are viewed as unsustainable extraction 
practices, particularly in the oil and gas sector. Second, a number of substitute products have 
emerged in response to high resource prices in the last two decades and from a desire to create a 
secure supply while reducing environmental impact. It is possible for Canada to diversify into 
these new markets but it will require departing, in part, from the secure patterns of production that 
has sustained it (Nicholson 2018, 22-23). 
 The last disruptive megatrend Canada faces is from the emergence of digital technologies 
such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous vehicles, big data analytics, cloud computing, 
custom manufacturing and 3D printing, Internet of Things (IoT), robots and drones, social media 
and platforms, and more. These technologies create disruption by altering consumer behaviour and 
expectations through ubiquitous availability of information, enabling new combinations of 
products and services, lowering barriers to entry for firms, creating new venues for business, and 
analytics-enabled improvements in product and process design (Vial 2019, 124). The latest 
estimates from the World Economic Forum (2018) estimate that the potential global benefits of 




(U.S.) by 2025. As of yet there are no estimates for the overall benefits they may bring for Canada 
but the most recent estimate of the size of the existing digital economy in Canada in 2017 was 
$109.7 billion, or 5.5 percent of the total economy. This is larger than the wholesale and retail 
trade sector, the mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction sector, and many others. It is 
estimated that over the period 2010 to 2017, the digital economy grew by 40.2 percent, far faster 
than the total economic growth of 28 percent (Sinclair 2019, 8-9). Even still, this is a conservative 
estimate as it only includes digitally-enabled infrastructure, e-commerce transactions, and 
digitally-delivered products and does not include the indirect effects such as digitally-enabled 
productivity increases. This preliminary evidence suggests the overall benefits of the digital 
transformation will be significant. However, this megatrend also poses great challenges for the 
future of work in Canada (Policy Horizons Canada 2019). Some work will shift from being long-
term and time-based to a temporary, task-based, gig economy; AI and automation will eliminate 
some jobs and fundamentally change others; and deeper changes may occur as technology allows 
people to work, earn, and spend in different locations. 
 The digital transformation, if it is managed properly and its own negative impacts can be 
minimized, has the potential to address the problems created by the other three megatrends. 
Productivity increases will help offset the losses from an aging population, adoption of these 
technologies will help companies grow their absorptive capacity and help adopt further 
technology, and they will facilitate the development of new business strategies. But these benefits 
will only be realized if Canada is able to overcome its “innovation problem.”  
 
2.1. Constructing Canada’s Innovation Problem 
 An innovation is most commonly understood by academia and statistical agencies as “a 
new or improved product or business process (or combination thereof) that differs significantly 
from the firm’s previous products or business processes and that has been introduced on the market 
or brought into use by the firm” (OECD 2018, 20). Countries’ innovation performance is typically 
measured in a variety of ways. This paper considers Canada’s performance relative to other 
countries in terms of innovativeness and innovation activities, innovation inputs, and innovation 




 The OECD defines innovation activities to include “all developmental, financial and 
commercial activities undertaken by a firm that are intended to result in an innovation for the firm” 
(OECD 2018, 20). For statistical purposes, innovation activities are classified into eight categories: 
research and experimental development; engineering, design, and other creative work; marketing 
and branding; intellectual property activities; employee training; software development and 
database activities; acquisition and lease of tangible assets; and innovation management (ibid., 87-
91). Of these, R&D and innovation management are, by default, innovation activities. The rest are 
only considered innovation activities if their undertaking is directly related to a firm’s innovation 
efforts. But a firm’s innovation activities may not result in innovation. Firms may develop or begin 
to adopt an innovation but ultimately decide to reject it. It is therefore useful to distinguish between 
firms that are innovation-active (i.e., that undertake innovation activities) and those that are 
innovative (i.e., that introduce innovations) (ibid., 81). Figure 2.32 compares the number of 
innovative and innovation-active firms as a percentage of total firms for 23 OECD countries. As 
one can expect innovativeness to be dependent on innovation activeness, the chart is organized 
according to innovation-activeness. Canada ranked 11th in the cohort for the proportion of 
innovation-active firms and, paradoxically, first for the proportion of innovative firms. That the 
percentage of innovative firms in Canada exceeds the number of innovation-active firms suggests 
 
2 The reference period varies by country. Data for Australia is for the period 2016-2017. Data for the United States, 









Figure 2.3: Innovative and Innovation-active firms as a percentage of total firms 




there is a large degree of error in the 
“innovativeness” statistic. Regardless, Canada 
appears to perform reasonably well compared to 
its peers on innovation activity. But by itself this 
statistic tells us little about the intensity of that 
activity. Examining the statistics for research and 
development (R&D) expenditures and 
information and communication technology 
(ICT) investment, two key innovation inputs and 
types of innovation activity, are believed to reveal 
more about a country’s innovation performance. 
R&D is regarded as a key input in the 
innovation process both for developing new 
technologies and for building absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989; 1990; Hall, Mairesse, 
and Mohnen 2009). The OECD defines R&D as 
“creative and systematic work undertaken in order 
to increase the stock of knowledge – including 
knowledge of humankind, culture and society – 
and to devise new applications of available 
knowledge” (OECD 2015, 44). It is often a key 
source of disruptive innovation and is a 
fundamental driver of technological change and 
long-term productivity growth. Given this, 
Canada’s low and declining gross expenditure on 
R&D (GERD) intensity (expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP) are regularly cited as a cause 
for concern. Figure 2.4a compares Canada’s 
GERD intensity with that of the OECD and the 
United States. Canada’s GERD intensity peaked 
in 2001 at 2.0 percent of GDP but declined 




























Higher Education Business Enterprise
Figure 2.4b: R&D intensities by performing sector 
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GERD intensity for the OECD and the United States increased over the same period from 2.2 
percent and 2.7 percent to 2.4 and 2.8 percent, respectively.  
 GERD can be broken down into performing sectors. Figure 2.4b presents the R&D 
intensities for the government (GOVERD/PERD), higher education (HERD), and business 
enterprise (BERD) sectors. The decline in GERD has primarily been caused by a decline in BERD 
which fell from a high of 1.3 percent of GDP in 2001 to 0.8 percent in 2018, a 36 percent decline. 
This is in stark contrast to the increase in BERD intensity in the OECD and the United States 
which saw a 15 percent and 7 percent increase over the same period, respectively (Figure 2.4c). 
The decline in BERD intensity is worrying because the business sector is the point where most 
economic benefits of innovation (e.g. productivity growth, new products, cost reductions) are 
realized.  
 Although R&D is an important source of 
disruptive innovation, much of the benefits of 
innovation are captured not through the 
development and commercialization of 
technology, but through its adoption throughout 
the economy. ICT adoption has been major 
source of productivity growth and a key enabler 
of business strategy innovation since the 1990s. 
ICT includes hardware, software, and 
communications technology. Unlike other 
technologies, these can be classified as general-
purpose technologies (Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg 1995; Helpman 1998) the impacts of 
which extend far beyond the normal returns from capital investment. Rather, most of their benefit 
comes from enabling organizational transformation and other complementary innovations that 
improve productivity and enable new products, or provide intangible benefits such as increased 
convenience, timeliness, quality, and variety (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000, 24-25).  
 ICT investment is commonly measured in terms of investment per job, investment as a 
percentage of GDP, and investment as a percentage of total investment. Figure 2.5 presents 
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Figure 2.5: Relative Canada-U.S. ICT Investment 




increasing investment gap between the two countries. Depending on the measure used, the gap in 
2014, the most recent year for which there is data available, was between 33 and 44 percent. 
Unfortunately, there are no internationally comparable data for ICT investment. However, there 
are comparable data for the contribution of ICT to labour productivity growth. This indicator is 
arguably more important for determining Canada’s ICT performance because outcomes, rather 
than inputs, are the true measure of innovation success. 
There is strong evidence that ICT has a positive but inconsistent effect on labour 
productivity growth (see Cardona, Kretschmer, and Strobel (2013) for a meta-analysis). Labour 
productivity growth, defined as growth in GDP per hour worked, can be decomposed into the 
components labour composition, capital intensity, and multifactor productivity (MFP). Labour 
composition reflects changes in the skills of the labour force and is measured as the proportion of 
the labour force with post-secondary education. Capital intensity is the quantity of capital services 
per worker and includes the benefits of technology that is embodied in capital. MFP is the residual 
and represents the effects not captured by capital intensity such as improvements resulting from 
changes in business strategy, network effects, economies of scale, etc. ICT investment affects 
labour productivity growth through the latter two components. There is no way to decompose MFP 
to determine ICT’s contribution, but the overall effect can be partially observed through the 
contribution to improvements from capital intensity.  
There is evidence that ICT’s contribution to labour productivity growth has slowed since 
2008 not only in Canada but for other industrialized countries as well  (Cette, Clerc, and Bresson 
2015; Mollins and St-Amant 2018). Figure 2.6 compares the contribution from ICT to labour 
productivity for 23 selected OECD countries for the periods 2001-2007 and 2010-20173. The chart 
is organized according to ICT’s contribution to labour productivity growth. Though there has been 
a slowdown in both labour productivity growth and in ICT’s contribution to it in almost every 
country, Canada fell from 9th place in terms of absolute contribution and 4th in terms of contribution 
as a proportion of labour productivity growth in the cohort in the 2001-2007 period to last both in 
terms of absolute contribution (0.06 points) and proportionally (5.4 percent). Thomas (2016, 4) 
found that this fall in ICT’s contribution was largely due to a steep decline in ICT capital intensity 
 




which was the product of a 1.0 percent decline in real ICT investment per year and a 0.8 percent 
per year increase in employment in the 2008-2014 period. 
 While it may be useful to estimate how much a country is investing in innovation inputs, 
ultimately it is the outcomes and returns of innovation that matter most. While it would be 
impossible to calculate the returns for every innovation, we can estimate some of the more 
important outcomes, such MFP growth, in aggregate. Though MFP includes effects from factors 
such as economies of scale, changes in the business cycle and capacity utilization, and 
measurement and model specification errors, in the long run most of these confounding factors 
disappear and MFP growth mostly represents the effects of technological change. Figure 2.74 
compares the contribution of MFP to labour productivity growth in 23 OECD countries for the 
periods 2001-2007 and 2010-2017. The chart is organized from largest to smallest contribution 
from MFP in the 2010-2017 period.  
 
4 Note that this data from the OECD only accounts for the contribution from capital deepening and MFP. The MFP 
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Labour productivity growth (2001-2007)
Figure 2.6: Contribution of ICT capital deepening to labour productivity for selected OECD countries 





Canada experienced an improvement in MFP growth between the two periods. In the 2001-
2007 period, MFP contributed only 0.34 points (34 percent) to the overall 0.99 percent growth in 
labour productivity. At this time, Canada placed 18th in the cohort in terms of absolute contribution 
and 19th as a proportion of labour productivity growth. In the 2010-2017 period, MFP growth 
recovered somewhat and contributed 0.80 points (75 percent) to labour productivity growth, which 
was 1.07 percent per year for the period, placing Canada 3rd in the cohort for absolute contribution 
and 5th proportionally. However, this relative improvement was caused by a decrease in the MFP 
growth of the rest of the cohort rather than Canada’s improved performance. The increase in MFP 
was also offset by a decrease in the contribution from capital intensity which resulted in an 
effectively unchanged rate of overall labour productivity growth. Labour productivity and MFP 
growth also remain low relative to the period in the late 1990s where Canada’s labour productivity 
growth was 3.1 percent per year between 1996 and 2000 and MFP growth contributed 1.6 points 
(52 percent). This low productivity growth has persisted since the 2000-2006 period when MFP 
growth declined by 1.7 points (106 percent) and labour productivity fell to 1.0 percent per year 
(Baldwin and Gu 2007, 16). Figure 2.7 shows a similar decline was not experienced in much of 
the rest of the industrialized world until the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The decline in MFP growth 
in the post-2000 period has been interpreted as an indicator that Canada was not able to reap the 
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Figure 2.7: Contribution of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth to labour productivity growth in selected OECD countries 




Canadian Academies 2018; Nicholson 2018; Innovation, Science, and Economic Development 
Canada 2019). 
 Statistics describing innovation activities, inputs, and outcomes may be useful for framing 
the state of innovation, but they do nothing to identify the causes of poor performance. This 
requires the use of theoretical frameworks. One can identify several theoretical frameworks that 
have informed innovation policy at the federal and provincial levels5 over the past fifty years both 
to interpret the problem behind the statistics and to offers solutions (Doern, Castle, and Phillips 
2016, 21-22).  
The first is the linear model which was dominant in the post-war period up to the late 1980s. 
It emphasised the importance of basic and applied research as the foundation of the innovation 
process which flows from basic to applied research, through development and production, to 
commercialization and diffusion (Godin 2006, 639). In this model, outputs are assumed to be 
proportionate to inputs (Doern, Castle, and Phillips 2016, 21) and the innovation problem is 
constructed as insufficient investment on the inputs side. The solution is to provide more incentives 
for R&D. Programs such as the Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) and the Scientific 
Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) Tax Credit, key pillars of Canada’s 
innovation policy framework, are reflective of this model. IRAP and SR&ED both provide 
financial assistance to firms performing R&D, though the former does so through grants and is 
focused on SMEs whereas the latter does so through tax expenditures. In addition to funding, IRAP 
provides advisory services and now includes a networking and employment component.  
Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing to the present, innovation policy was based on 
various systems theories of innovation where innovation is theorized as a non-linear, networked, 
and collaborative process (Doern, Castle, and Phillips 2016, 22). These theories, which include 
national and regional systems of innovation (Niosi, Manseau, and Godin 2000; Niosi, Bas, and 
Zhegu 2005) and clusters (Holbrook and Wolfe 2002; Wolfe and Gertler 2003) emphasize not only 
the role of R&D, but also the connections between actors, competencies,  learning, and the role of 
institutions such as universities and governments. Universities, in addition to their research role, 
train highly qualified personnel that are a key source of human capital for businesses. 
 
5 Presently, there is a gap in the literature with respect to provincial innovation policy. As such, this study focuses on 





Governments, in addition to providing financial supports, create regulatory environments that can 
help or hinder the innovation process. The connections not only between business, governments, 
and academia, but between businesses and other businesses facilitate the knowledge transfer and 
learning that is central to the innovation process. During this period there was also a shift in broader 
economic policy toward a neoliberal economic paradigm and innovation policies tended to focus 
on system conditions, deregulation, and free trade and avoided direct supports. However, there 
were several programs and institutions introduced in the late 1980s and early 2000s that provided 
direct support to Canada’s innovation system. These included granting organizations and programs 
such as the Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI), Genome Canada, the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research (CIHR), the Canada Research Chairs Program (CRCP), and the collaboratively 
focused Networks of Centres of Excellence (NCE). Of these, the NCE was most closely associated 
with industrial innovation and was emblematic of the systems perspective. It was established to 
connect industry with academia to solve social and economic problems, commercialize more 
Canadian research, increase private sector R&D, and increase the stock of highly qualified 
personnel. This program, along with other changes to the granting system, represented an 
important shift from a focus on basic research to commercial application (Atkinson-Grosjean 2006, 
xiii-xiv).  
There were few major programs that supported innovation generally introduced in the mid 
to late 2000s and early 2010s. Many of the initiatives at this time were focused on specific projects 
such as Internet adoption and arctic research. It was not until 2017 that several new, large 
innovation programs were introduced. These included the Strategic Innovation Fund (SIF), the 
Venture Capital Catalyst Initiative (VCCI), Innovative Solutions Canada, and the Superclusters 
Initiative. SIF was modelled as a counterpart to IRAP. The latter provides funding for R&D 
projects less than $10 million and the former provides funding for projects greater than $10 million. 
SIF absorbed the NCE in 2018. The VCCI was established to provide an urgently needed increase 
in the availability of venture capital for start-ups and scale-ups. Innovative Solutions Canada was 
established as a pre-commercial procurement program which would provide support for new 
technologies that would be beneficial to society. The Superclusters Initiative established five 
technology-based, industry-led consortia aimed at incentivizing large-scale industry partnerships 
to increase R&D investment in strategic technologies, create new companies, commercialize new 
products, processes and services, connect partners to global supply chains, and create a high-




generation manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and ocean technology. There was also a shift in 
strategic planning for innovation. The Economic Strategy Tables outline directions for federal 
support for the agri-food, health/biosciences, tourism, and natural resources sectors and for 
advanced manufacturing, digital technologies, and clean technologies.   
Although it is too soon to know if the new initiatives will have any impact, the poor 
performance suggested by conventional indicators suggests that the policy frameworks 
implemented to this point have had little success. It may be time for a shift in perspective. 
Innovation ecosystems is a perspective that has emerged in the last fifteen years that may offer 
useful insights. Like systems of innovation and clusters, it is a systems theory of innovation, but 
one that places emphasis on firms and specific technologies rather than on framework conditions.  
 
2.2. A New Perspective: Innovation Ecosystems 
“Innovation ecosystem” is a fuzzy concept and many authors use it without explicitly 
defining it (Granstrand and Holgersson 2020, 2). The concept originally stems from the business 
ecosystems literature beginning with Moore (1993) who argued that network theories of business 
offered little assistance for managers in making strategic decisions because they did not accurately 
reflect how firms functioned. Taking inspiration from the idea of biological ecosystems, Moore 
suggested that firms do not operate as members of an industry, but as members of business 
ecosystems which cross several industries, and that it is competition between ecosystems, rather 
than between businesses, that drives technological change. In business ecosystems, “companies 
evolve capabilities around a new innovation: they work cooperatively and competitively to support 
new products, satisfy customer needs, and eventually incorporate the next round of innovations” 
(ibid., 76). This definition stressed the networked nature of innovation, the co-evolution of 
capabilities, and cooperation as well as competition. The innovation ecosystems concept emerged 
when Adner (2006) expanded the business ecosystem concept to discuss the new risks that arose 
in the innovation process as the result of such a networked structure. Adner (2006, 98) defined an 
innovation ecosystem as, “the collaborative arrangements through which firms combine their 
individual offerings into a coherent, customer-facing solution.” Despite beginning with similar 
definitions, the business and innovation ecosystems streams can be differentiated by their focuses. 
The business ecosystems literature focuses more on value capture whereas the innovation 




two streams share many concepts particularly those surrounding ecosystem lifecycles, actors, and 
roles.  
 Moore’s (1993) original work identified four phases of the business ecosystem lifecycle. 
In the first phase, birth, a firm develops the idea for an innovation and works with customers and 
suppliers to develop a value proposition. Complementor firms attach to the ecosystem at this stage 
to develop parallel innovations that complement and add value to the core innovation. In the second 
phase, expansion, the ecosystem scales up and expands, often competing with other ecosystems 
offering substitute goods for suppliers, customers, and complementors. In phase three, leadership, 
ecosystem actors consolidate market power by establishing technical standards and control over 
critical components and customers. In the final stage, renewal/death, a mature ecosystem is 
challenged by new innovations and ecosystems, or changes in regulations, buying patterns, or 
macroeconomic conditions. The dominant ecosystem can respond by trying to stifle the new 
ecosystem or influence changing context conditions, adopt the new innovations or regulations, or 
fundamentally restructure. Failure to adapt will likely mean the death of the ecosystem. Since 
Moore’s original article, many different lifecycle models have been proposed. Thomas and Autio 
(2015, 6-7) reviewed and synthesized several of these models and suggest a three stage ecosystem 
lifecycle model. The first stage is concerned with early technological development, rulemaking 
among actors, resource gathering, the establishment of organizational structures, and co-option of 
complementors and suppliers. In the second stage, the ecosystem grows rapidly as network effects 
accumulate. Intense competition prompts ecosystem actors to engage in marketing and alliance-
making to drive adoption and acquire greater resources. These activities increase the legitimacy of 
the ecosystem. In the third stage, legitimacy has been established and the ecosystem has become 
dominant. Activities at this stage shift from a growth and value creation focus to a control and 
value capture focus.  
Regardless of the model, there are a variety of actors and roles that are necessary for the 
ecosystem to carry out the activities at each stage. Moore (1993) stressed the role of suppliers, 
producers, complementor firms, and customers. Iansiti and Levien (2004, 70-71) expanded and 
clarified the list to include, for example, financiers, operational technology providers, producers 
of complementary goods, competitors, customers, regulatory agencies, and media outlets. 
However, firms remain the key actors in this perspective. There are a variety of roles these actors 




key roles in innovation ecosystems: leadership roles, direct value creation roles, value creation 
support roles, and entrepreneurial ecosystem roles. The actors performing these roles may not 
remain constant throughout the ecosystem lifecycle, but each is vital for ecosystem success.  
Ecosystem leaders, variously called keystones (Iansiti and Levien 2004), platform leaders 
(Gawer and Cusumano 2002) and hubs (Iyer, Lee, and Venkatraman 2006), are central firms in 
the ecosystem which perform the activities of ecosystem governance, forging partnerships, 
platform management, and value management (Dedehayir, Mäkinen, and Ortt 2018, 22-23). 
Ecosystem governance activities include defining the role of other actors in the ecosystem and 
coordinating their interactions. This is especially important in the earliest phases of ecosystem 
development and in ecosystems that lack a common platform.6 Governance also includes 
coordinating resource flows among ecosystem actors. This activity is more important in later 
stages of ecosystem emergence when resources are abundant enough to require more purposeful 
management. Leaders forge partnerships by attracting potential partners to the ecosystem and 
acting as intermediary between partners to create relationships and collaboration. The leader is key 
in defining a common vision and objectives and sharing those with partners. For platform-based 
innovation ecosystems, platform leaders are responsible for designing and building the platform 
and generating value in the user community by ensuring access to the platform and compatibility 
of new innovations. The final role for ecosystem leaders is managing the value created in the 
ecosystem. This includes both the value contributed by the leader themselves, but also ensuring 
that other participants are able to share in the overall value. If participants are not able to capture 
value for themselves, they will likely leave, and the ecosystem will collapse. An alternative value 
management role is for the leader to dominate the system through vertical and horizontal 
integration, accruing all value to itself. However, in the long term, this strategy will usually lead 
to the ecosystem’s demise. 
There are four roles that directly contribute to value creation: suppliers, assemblers, 
complementors, and users (Dedehayir, Mäkinen, and Ortt 2018, 23-24). Suppliers produce and 
deliver key products, services and technologies to assemblers who combine these inputs to deliver 
new products, services and technologies to users. Complementors exist in parallel to suppliers and 
assemblers and add value by offering goods and services which are compatible with the platforms 
 
6 Platforms are “products, services or technologies developed by one or more firms, and which serve as foundations 
upon which a larger number of firms can build further complementary innovations and potentially generate network 




used by or goods produced by core ecosystem actors. Users are the ultimate purchasers of the 
goods and services produced by an ecosystem. Without them, value cannot be created. In addition 
to purchasing, they are key in defining the needs which initiate ecosystem development and 
providing feedback to improve products and services. 
There are two roles which do not create value directly but provide supports for value 
creation (Dedehayir, Mäkinen, and Ortt 2018, 24). The first is the “expert” which includes 
individual technical experts and consultants, and universities and research organizations. These 
actors provide knowledge, inventions, and ideas that are essential in the early stages of ecosystem 
development. The second is the “champion” who provides the energy to overcome barriers to 
innovation development and strengthen the connections between ecosystem actors.  
The three final roles are the entrepreneur, sponsor, and regulator (Dedehayir, Mäkinen, and 
Ortt 2018, 24-25). Entrepreneurs are key in the early stages of ecosystem development. They can 
be either individuals or firms and can occupy many different roles. First, they often identify 
opportunities and engage in partnership forging to exploit those opportunities. While this is similar 
to the ecosystem leader role, the entrepreneur may not be the leader as they may not be responsible 
for ecosystem governance, or platform or value management. Entrepreneurs are key mediators 
between experts and those looking to commercialize technologies and research. Sponsors provide 
support for new products through financial assistance, co-developments, purchasing, mentoring, 
and education. Regulators are responsible for creating favourable economic, political, and 
regulatory conditions.  
Innovation ecosystems has much in common with the older systems of innovation and 
clusters frameworks, so much so that the concept has been accused of being superfluous and of 
adding no value compared to these older systems theories (Oh et al. 2016). Admittedly, the concept 
is still maturing, and more efforts have been made in recent years to increase conceptual rigour, as 
demonstrated by the reviews referenced in this paper. However, the concept has several redeeming 
features that distinguish it from previous frameworks and provide analytical value. First, though 
innovation ecosystems, systems of innovation, and clusters all acknowledge the roles played by 
firms, research and educational institutions, and governments, innovation ecosystems focuses on 
firms and relationships between firms, and is not necessarily concerned with geography whereas 
systems of innovation and clusters focus on geographical areas and the relationships between firms 




focused on providing guidance to support public policy for innovation, innovation ecosystems 
provides guidance for managers making strategic management decisions (ibid., 1064). Clusters, 
with a basis in value chain and value network concepts, bridge this gap to an extent but whereas 
value chain and value networks tend to take the environment as given and recognize only the actors 
involved in the chain, innovation ecosystems acknowledges the role of complementors and treats 
the environment as constantly evolving and as something that can be actively managed by 
exercising influence through regulations, media, customers, innovative complementors, 
substitutes, etc. (Gomes et al. 2018, 13-14). Finally, innovation ecosystems puts more emphasis 
on the role of users in the system (Autio and Thomas 2014, 3).  
Though the innovation ecosystems concept is more practically useful for firms than it is 
for public policy, it can add value as a framing device. Much of Canada’s innovation policy has 
focused on framework conditions and on supporting upstream activities such as R&D. Applying 
the innovation ecosystems perspective suggests that more attention should be given to the 
experience of firms and to the downstream activities of users. These insights coincide with ideas 
that have recently been made by some innovation policy experts: that more attention be given to 
firm-level factors that influence the choice to adopt innovation as a business strategy, and that 
more attention be given to the demand side of innovation (Council of Canadian Academies 2009; 
2013a; 2013b; Nicholson 2018; Edler 2019).  
 
2.3. A New Perspective: Consideration of Firm-Level Factors 
The Council of Canadian Academies (Council of Canadian Academies 2009; 2013a; 
2013b) has argued that public policy is too general, has focused too much on symptoms of the 
innovation problem rather than on its causes, and that more attention should be given to the factors 
that lead firms to choose innovation as a business strategy. These factors include (Council of 
Canadian Academies 2009, Chapter 4): the structural characteristics of an industry such as the 
number of foreign-controlled firms, the distribution of firm size, and the position of firms in North 
American value chains; the intensity of competition in an industry; the climate for new ventures 
including the availability of venture financing and commercial skills, the effectiveness of 
technology transfer mechanisms; public policy factors such as macroeconomic conditions, trade, 
education, regulation, taxation, and specific policies for supporting innovation; and the level of 




United States and a lower relative cost of labour are the main reasons why many Canadian firms 
do not stake more of their business on innovation as these have created a profitable environment 
where Canadian firms do not have to rely on innovation to survive. However, the work by the CCA 
and Nicholson has, for the most part, focused on systemic factors at the industry level if not at the 
national level. An additional possible explanation is that Canadian firms are facing challenges that 
prevent them from innovating effectively and that these problems are not visible in the overall 
statistics. This is inferred by the distributions underlying the R&D and ICT investment, and MFP 
growth statistics which reveal that the poor performance is not widespread but is concentrated in 
a few sectors. The evidence here draws on several analyses comparing Canada to the United States. 
While a broader international perspective would provide a more balanced comparison, there is a 
dearth of such analysis. However, the ones used here serve to illustrate the point.  
 There are few decompositions of business R&D in Canada. The first, by ab Iorworth 
(2005), used OECD data from 1999 to compare business R&D intensities in the agriculture, 
utilities, mining, construction, manufacturing, and service sectors in Canada and the United States. 
In that year, Canada had an overall business R&D intensity of 1.06 percent, 0.88 points less than 
the United States’ business R&D intensity of 1.94 percent. The decomposition revealed that 93 
percent of this gap (0.82 points) could be explained by lower R&D intensity in the manufacturing 
sector. This was the result of relatively lower R&D intensity in industries such as other 
transportation equipment, electrical machinery, and motor vehicles in Canada compared to their 
counterparts in the United States, and a smaller economic share of industries with higher R&D 
intensities relative to their counterparts in the United States such as office and computer 
equipment; radio, telecommunications, and communications equipment; and pharmaceuticals (ab 
Iorworth 2005, 22, 26). A further 34 percent (0.30 points) could be explained by lower R&D 
intensity in the services sector and the services sector having a smaller share of the economy than 
in the United States. The deficit was largely caused by the wholesale and retail trade industry 
which suffered from both of these problems (ibid., 22, 28). The overall gap was partially offset by 
manufacturing having a larger share in the Canadian economy than in the United States. This 
reduced the gap by 26 percent (0.23 points) (ibid., 22). Two analyses by the Council of Canadian 
Academies ( 2013b, 27-34; 2018, 73) had similar findings: that the gap between Canada and 
similar countries was the result of lower R&D intensities in industries such as auto manufacturing 
and chemicals, and a smaller share of the economy of high-R&D-intensity industries such as 




no thorough analysis of why R&D intensities are lower in key industries, nor why other high-
R&D-intensity industries do not have a higher share of the economy. 
 The Centre for the Study of Living Standards began studying the Canada-U.S. ICT 
investment gap in 2005 and has produced several reports that provide incrementally more detailed 
investigations with greater levels of industry granularity. In 2004, the investment per worker gap 
was 54.9 percent (CSLS 2005, 28), but a decomposition of this gap revealed that over 25 percent 
of it could be accounted for by the professional, scientific, and technical services; and 
manufacturing sectors which accounted for 14.5 percent and 10.8 percent of the gap, respectively 
(ibid., 49). A later analysis by Sharpe and Rai (2013, 17) found that the gap had reduced to 42.2 
percent in 2011 but that 92.2 percent of the gap was a result of the gap in software investment 
(ibid., 42). Over 60 percent of the total gap was accounted for by the gaps in the information and 
cultural industries; and the professional, scientific, and technical services sectors which 
contributed 39.1 percent and 22.3 percent to the gap, respectively (ibid., 50). These two sectors 
also accounted for almost half of the software investment per worker, contributing 30.1 percent 
and 17.2 percent. There was a third major contributor to the software gap, management of 
companies and enterprises, which contributed 17.0 percent (ibid., 61). A somewhat most recent 
analysis by Thomas (2016a, 9) shows that this gap and the contributions to it persisted  through 
2013. Sharpe and Rai (2013) suggested possible explanations for the gap including measurement 
issues, the larger share of small firms in Canada, and lower managerial education. Thomas (2016a) 
suggests these and also includes lower relative labour costs between Canada and the United States 
and stricter regulation as reasons for low ICT investment in the information and cultural industries 
and professional, scientific, and technical services sectors. 
 There is only one detailed study that decomposes  MFP growth for Canada by sector, by 
Calver and Murray (2016). When decomposing productivity growth, one must consider not only 
productivity growth within sectors, but also the reallocation of labour between sectors. Even if a 
sector has negative productivity growth, if it has higher than average productivity and its share of 
total hours worked increases, it will contribute positively to aggregate growth. This reallocation 
effects, the within-sector effect, and a combined reallocation-growth effect make up the aggregate 
productivity change (Sharpe 2010). For the period 1997-2014, Calver and Murray (2016, 30) find 
that there was an overall decline of 1.09 percent per year in MFP. The two industries that 




finance, insurance, and real estate sectors (-1.97 points). However, this was offset by productivity 
increases in manufacturing (3.69 points), wholesale trade (2.43 points), retail trade (1.39 points), 
and information and cultural industries (1.17 points). These contributions were primarily driven 
by within-sector changes as the two reallocation effects were offsetting. However, when 
determining whether an industry has an innovation problem, it is the within-sector effects that 
matter most.  
The poor performance in specific sectors suggests that there are challenges common to 
firms within those sectors that are preventing them from being effective innovators. Policy should 
therefore be targeted to addressing these difficulties where possible. While most of Canada’s 
innovation policy takes a general approach by supporting R&D, education, training, technology, 
and networking and collaboration between actors and institutions, there is substantial precedent 
for targeted programming.  Figure 2.8 presents the number of direct-support innovation programs 
in Canada by the sector they target. The figure was constructed using a portal on Innovation 
Canada’s (2020) website which allows businesses to search for supports using various criteria. A 
search on February 10, 2020 for activities under the category, “conduct R&D, innovate, develop a 
product or service” returned 301 direct support programs, once duplicates had been removed, 
offered at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels and by the private sector. In this value, the 
various research facilities operated by the National Research Council have been compressed into 
a single program as they are similar enough to be considered redundant. If these are included, the 
Figure 2.8: Number of programs focusing on specific sectors 
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number of programs is 361. Figure 2.8 was generated by coding for the sectors that programs 
focused on as described in the program’s summary description.  
Approximately 10 percent of programs are targeted toward the agriculture or food space, 
and 9 percent are targeted toward the arts or media. Biotech, health, or life sciences; ICT/digital; 
and clean tech or green tech each account for approximately 4 percent. The rest each account for 
less than 2 percent. The remainder, not represented in the figure, are general programs that do not 
have a sectoral focus. Though each sector represents a small fraction of overall programming, the 
total amount of targeted programming is significant, representing 36 percent (106 programs)7 of 
total programming. Note that these proportions should be interpreted cautiously as these values 
only reflect the quantity of programs and not their budgetary significance. 
Framing innovation policy in terms of sectors may seem to be at odds with innovation 
ecosystems as the perspective argues that firms operate as part of ecosystems rather than sectors, 
but this is not necessarily problematic. Firms operating in the same sector undertake similar 
activities and often use similar technology. It can therefore be expected that they will experience 
similar problems. Working with firms to construct problems from the bottom up and creating 
policies that address those problems can be expected to lead to policies that are effectively sector 
specific. This leads to policies that both address real problems faced by firms while reducing to 
risk of policy errors resulting from policymakers’ knowledge gaps. It also overcomes the 
difficulties of mapping specific innovation ecosystems and developing policies for them and 
allows policies to be developed in a way that is administratively convenient for governments.  
 
2.4. A New Perspective: Supporting the Demand Side of Innovation 
 Authors such as Nicholson (2018) and Edler (2019) have recently called for increased 
attention to users and the demand side of innovation. While Canada’s current framework has a 
strong focus on supply side measures, a well-functioning innovation process requires both strong 
supply- and demand-side supports. If one side of the process is lacking, the process as a whole 
suffers (Mowery 1979, 143). The lack of demand-side supports may be contributing to poor 
innovation performance in some sectors.   
 




Whereas supply-side policies focus on reducing the costs of innovation and on increasing 
the production and exchange of knowledge, demand-side policies increase innovation diffusion by 
supporting a user’s ability to ask for and use innovations, help define new functional requirements 
for products and services, and improve user involvement in the innovation process (Edler 2019, 
7). Correspondingly, the two approaches used different tools. Supply-side instruments include 
grants and tax-credits for R&D, financial assistance for commercialization and start-ups, support 
for education and training, incentives to support industry-academia relationships, and technology 
transfer programs (Nemet 2009, 702; Edler 2019, 5). Demand-side instruments include public 
procurement of innovation, price-based instruments such as subsidies or tax incentives for 
innovation adoption, awareness measures and information campaigns, innovation-specific 
training, initiatives to define needs, support for user-producer interaction and user involvement in 
the innovation process, and regulation to reduce uncertainties and signal future expectations (Edler 
2019, 9; see also OECD 2011). Support for demonstration projects can be classified as either a 
supply- or demand-side measure as they both help developers bring an innovation to market and 
increase users’ knowledge of the innovation. Though the two approaches are near opposites in 
their focuses and instruments, the justification for the two types of intervention are similar.  
Policy intervention can be justified by the many market and system failures that impede 
the innovation process (Edler 2009, 4; OECD 2014, 9-10). Supply-side approaches are usually 
focused on correcting underinvestment in research created by positive externalities and the quasi-
public nature of knowledge which reduce the ability to appropriate the benefits of costly 
investments in research and reduce investment below socially optimal levels. Supply-side policies 
such as R&D subsidies can help correct this. Transaction costs that do not vary with the size of 
investment reduce the value of investments in smaller projects and start-ups, and lead to socially 
suboptimal investment. Supply-side policies such as public pools of venture capital can offset this 
deficiency. Demand-side policies that increase demand for innovations can also help by reducing 
the uncertainty about potential returns to investment. There may be relatively high search costs, 
particularly for small firms or in firms lacking expertise, related to screening innovations and 
making decisions on which ones to adopt. These firms may also have greater difficulty articulating 
their needs and not know what information is relevant and what is not. These challenges can also 
necessitate large marketing costs for supplier firms who need to spend more to reach and convince 
potential customers. Supply-side programs for training, technology demonstration programs, and 




process can help reduce these failures. Network effects, path-dependencies, and managerial 
inexperience can create high switching costs and lead to technological lock-in for users. These also 
create high entry costs for suppliers. These barriers can be reduced through a combination of 
subsidies, demonstration, and public procurement. Finally, many innovation projects have high 
levels of risk created by high upfront investments, long lags between investment and return, and 
uncertainty as to what the returns will be. This can lead to underinvestment in innovations that 
may provide social benefits. In this case, the public sector can bear some of the risk through 
financing and procurement to leverage investment. In addition to correcting market failures, there 
are other reasons by which intervention can be justified (Edler 2009, 4-5). Supporting innovation 
to address societal problems can enable new solutions and create a more efficient and effective 
public service. Supporting industrial modernization can drive productivity increases and 
supporting innovation to create lead markets can help increase competitive advantage both 
domestically and abroad. These last two justifications should be used cautiously and should be in 
addition to satisfying societal needs. 
Many of these reasons have been used to justify innovation policies in Canada. However, 
these policies are heavily skewed toward the supply side of innovation. The brief description given 
previously of major innovation policies and institutions introduced in the last fifty years illustrates 
the focus on R&D, technology development, commercialization, start-ups, and linking businesses 
and academia. Figure 2.9 provides a more comprehensive view. Using the same 301 summaries of 
support programs for innovation used in Figure 2.8, Figure 2.9 was generated by coding programs 
by whether they were focused on supply-side measures, demand-side measures, or a combination. 
Supply-side measures included programs focusing on research; innovation development; 
commercialization; intellectual property; start-ups; venture capital; collaboration or networks; 
technology or knowledge transfer; training, education, mentorship, or advising; hiring or labour; 
or clusters or incubators. Demand-side measures included programs focusing on technology 
evaluation; improving innovation awareness; or innovation adoption. Programs could be classified 
in multiple categories. The combination category includes programs with at least one focus from 




In all, 82 percent of programs focused on the supply side, 9 percent on the demand side, and 9 
percent were some combination of the two. The programs that did not meet any of the classification 
criteria are not represented in the figure but can be classified as general business development 
supports that did not include explicit mention of supply or demand-side measures. However, these 
do not exclude the prospect of innovation and so these results should be interpreted conservatively. 
As with the results in Figure 2.8, these results reflect the quantity of programming in each area but 
do not reflect the programs’ budgetary significance.  
 Nicholson (2018, 5-6) has suggested that Canada’s population size relative to other 
industrialized countries implies that the country can only be expected to be responsible for 2 to 3 
percent of world-first innovations. Canada’s low-R&D intensity industrial structure reinforces this. 
A better strategy for Canada, rather than focusing on supplying innovations to the world, may be 
to become rapid and efficient adopters of innovations produced elsewhere. This is supported by 
evidence that suggests the most value of an innovation is not produced by its commercialization 
but through its diffusion (Eaton and Kortum 1995; Bhidé 2006). Achieving such a strategy will 
require greater emphasis on demand-side policy supports. This is not to say that these should 
substitute for supply-side supports, as both are important to the innovation process, but the 
imbalance between the two sides will need to be corrected. 
 
 
Source: Author's work using data from Innovation Canada (2020) 







2.5. Digital Innovation in Mining, Oil and Gas Extraction, and Construction 
 Building on the previous insights, this study seeks to understand the barriers to digital 
innovation faced by firms in the mining, oil and gas, and construction industries in Saskatchewan.  
Of the four megatrends threatening to disrupt Canada’s profitable low-innovation 
equilibrium, the digital transformation has potential to help address the other three. Vial (2019, 
121) defines digital transformation as “a process that aims to improve an entity by triggering 
significant changes to its properties through combination of information, computing, 
communication, and connectivity technologies.” This definition can be applied broadly to society 
or to organizations. At the organizational level, digital transformation is often a strategic response 
to disruptions that involve altering value creation paths by implementing structural changes to 
overcome barriers (ibid., 122). This description implies a complex process that goes beyond 
discrete cases of digital innovation, which may involve technological development or adoption of 
existing solutions, to include transformation in organizational structures or business models.  
Understanding the challenges firms face in this process will be necessary for Canada to become 
an effective adopter. Though this study only focuses on three industries in a specific province and 
has no pretenses of generalizability beyond those industries in that province, the findings will 
contribute to a broader knowledge base in the future. 
The study takes MFP growth as its basis for selecting industries of study as MFP growth 
is a key indicator of innovation outcomes. Subsequently, the study focuses on the mining, oil and 
gas, and construction industries. These were the only sectors to have negative labour productivity 
growth in the 2000-2016 period and this was entirely the result of negative MFP growth (Gu and 
Macdonald 2020, 35-36). Mining and oil and gas extraction had the greatest MFP loss over the 
period and though there were sectors such as utilities that had a greater MFP loss than in 
construction, these losses were offset by other factors such as increased capital intensity. That the 
MFP decline in these sectors was enough to create a decline in overall labour productivity should 
suggest that these are the sectors where the innovation problem is most heavily felt. As noted 
previously, studies have found that other factors such as increased investment in marginal 
resources and changes in business decision making brought on by high resource prices accounted 
for much of the MFP decline in the mining and oil and gas extraction sector in the 2000s (Bradley 
and Sharpe 2009a; 2009b). These studies also found that during this time, contrary to the 




This suggests that is resource-intensive economies such as that found in Saskatchewan, MFP 
growth may not be as reliable an indicator of innovation performance as it is often believed. 
Nonetheless, resource price crashes have reduced the amount of capital firms in the sector have to 
invest in innovation and firms may be facing new challenges specific to new digital technologies. 
Though the high resource prices in the 2000s were enough to sustain increased standards of living 
despite the productivity losses at the time, the importance of the sector to the national economy, 
especially in the Western Canadian provinces, make it important to understand the challenges the 
sector is facing to ensure that sufficient supports are in place to support its productivity revival. 
With respect to productivity performance in construction, there have been few studies. The most 
recent, by Harrison (2007), does not provide insight into the contribution of innovation to 
productivity growth in the sector but suggests that there might be a high degree of measurement 
error that is deflating the productivity estimates. It is uncertain if these errors have been corrected.  
The study focuses on Saskatchewan primarily for feasibility. Though the previous 
discussion focused on the national innovation narrative, like the industries of focus the province 
appears to be a “most likely” case as conventional innovation indicators suggest it has poor 
performance and the province is often ranked poorly on innovation scoreboards (Conference Board 
of Canada 2020). Phillips and Ballantyne (Submitted) argue that in spite of the indicators, 
Saskatchewan is in fact a highly innovative province. Universities and public research institutions 
play a significant role in conducting strategic research and investing in large-scale research 
infrastructure such as the Canadian Light Source, the largest university-led infrastructure project 
in the country. These institutions have been key players in making the province a world leader in 
the biosciences. As a result, the province has a very robust agri-food and biotechnology cluster 
and is a key player in the global biotechnology innovation system. However, the benefits in other 
industries have been less pronounced. This may suggest that, as in Canada overall, the supply-side 
approach taken in Saskatchewan may not be sufficient and that there may be demand-side barriers 
than are inhibiting the province’s broader innovation performance. 
The mining, oil and gas extraction, and construction industries comprise a significant share 
of Saskatchewan’s economy and place in the top four industries alongside real estate and rental 
and leasing, and agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (Table 2.1). Together, the top four 
industries account for just over 50 percent of GDP. Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction 




Construction was the fourth largest contributor, accounting for 7.1 percent. Given these importance 
of these industries to the province, the findings of this paper may contribute constructively to 
innovation and economic growth in the province. 
Table 2.1: GDP by industry in Saskatchewan, 2018 
The research questions for this project are: How do firms in the industries of study 
innovate? What challenges do they face in the business environment and how are they adapting? 
Have they engaged with digital technology and, if so, what challenges have they faced in adoption? 
Where do the ideas for innovation come from? Have firms taken advantage of existing innovation 
policies and what improvements or new supports would they like to see? In answering these 
questions, this project will identify directions for future policy research and serve as a foundation 
for discussions surrounding policy in these industries.   
Industry GDP  
(2012 dollars at basic 
prices, millions) 





All 82 166.2 - - 
Mining, quarrying, and oil and 
gas extraction 
21 693.6 26.4 26.4 
Real estate and rental and leasing 7 643.4 9.3 35.7 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting 
7 224.1 8.8 44.5 
Construction 5861.5 7.1 51.6 






This study was performed using semi-structured interviews with representatives of firms 
in the mining, oil and gas, and construction industries in Saskatchewan. Potential participants in 
the mining industry were identified using the Saskatchewan Exploration and Development 
Highlights 2018 (Saskatchewan Ministry of Energy and Resources 2018). Potential participants in 
the oil and gas sector were identified using Oil Allowable Rate of Production Reports 
(Saskatchewan Ministry of Energy and Resources 2020). Potential participants in the construction 
sector were identified using the Regina Construction Association’s member directory under the 
category of “general contractor” (Regina Construction Association 2020). In all three industries, 
potential participants only had to be operating in Saskatchewan and not necessarily be 
headquartered there. 
The goal of the study was to capture 10 to 20 interviews for each industry, following the 
principle of saturation. Saturation is reached “when there is enough information to replicate the 
study (O’Reilly and Parker 2013; Walker 2012), when the ability to obtain additional new 
information has been attained (Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006), and when further coding is no 
longer feasible (Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006)” (Fusch and Ness 2015). The relevant literature 
for this study is unclear as to how many interviews this will require. In the broader literature on 
saturation, the only clear takeaway is that the sample size required for saturation is highly context 
dependent. Mason (2010), for example, found in a study of 532,646 PhD abstracts using qualitative 
methods that the mean sample size was 31. However, the standard deviation was 18.7, indicating 
a very large variability. Similarly, Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) found in a study of 60 
interviews that saturation occurred after the first 12 interviews and that basic themes could be 
identified after the first six. 10 to 20 interviews from each of the three industries under study 
therefore seemed a reasonable range to achieve saturation. Unfortunately, due to complications 
created by the COVID-19 pandemic and events such as the oil price war between Russia and Saudi 
Arabia, the lower threshold was not achieved in the mining, and oil and gas extraction industries. 
The study was still able to identify several common themes but cannot be considered 
comprehensive as a result. 
Participants were recruited via email and telephone. Invitations were addressed to 
technology and innovation officers within firms. In cases where no such position could be 




to forward the message to individuals within the firm with knowledge of the firm’s technology 
experiences, business strategy, and operations in Saskatchewan. A consent form detailing the 
study’s goals and procedures was sent to participants either in the initial email or in a follow-up 
email if contact was established over the phone. Participants self-selected into the study either by 
contacting the researcher, if contact was established through email, or in the initial phone call. 
Interviews were not limited to one per firm as people may have differing perspectives and 
experiences within the firm. In cases where a firm was represented by multiple participants, 
participants could choose to be interviewed individually or together.  
Interviews were conducted either over the phone or in person at the participant’s 
convenience and as feasibility allowed. The interviews were audio-recorded with participants’ 
consent. In cases where consent was not given for recording, the interviewer recorded the interview 
by hand. The manual records are not a true transcript but were paraphrased to capture key ideas. 
After the interview was completed, a copy of the audio-recording was shared with the Social 
Science Research Laboratory at the University of Saskatchewan. Laboratory staff transcribed the 
interviews and removed any identifying information such as participants’ names or the names of 
companies. Afterward, the interviewer read through the transcripts and identified possible 
quotations. The transcripts and the list of possible quotations, including stylized versions, were 
returned to participants for review. Participants were given the opportunity to alter their transcripts 
and quotations to provide clarity or to remove other potentially identifying information. Once 
satisfied with the documents, participants signed a release form granting the researcher to use their 
quotations. In cases where participants did not sign the release forms, it was assumed the 
transcripts were correct and could be included in the analysis, but that permission was not granted 
to quote them. 
The interviews were semi-structured and generally followed this format: Participants were 
asked to describe their business and the challenges they faced in the business environment in the 
last several years. They were then asked how the firm was responding to the changes and what 
role digital technologies played in this response or in the firm’s business strategy generally. They 
were asked what challenges the firm faced in adopting these technologies and how they overcome 
or were planning to overcome them. Participants were then asked where they got the ideas for their 
digital innovations, what their experiences with new skills or work resulting from the innovations 




questions were whether the firm had used any public policies for innovation or business 
development to support their innovation efforts, how effective they thought these programs were, 
whether they thought there was a role for the public sector in helping the firm overcome its 
challenges, and what support they would find beneficial. Finally, participants were given the 
opportunity to discuss any other issues they felt were relevant or to return to previous topics. Other 
questions exploring specific topics breached in the interview or topics that repeatedly appeared in 
other interviews were also asked. 
Data analysis was performed after the interviews had been collected, transcribed, and 
approved. Analysis followed a basic interpretive qualitative approach (Merriam 2002; Merriam 
and Tisdell 2016, 23-25) and was performed using a two-stage, provisional coding method 
(Saldaña 2016, 168-169). This method uses a combination of deductive and inductive coding, 
beginning from a list of pre-generated codes and adding, removing, and altering codes as they 
emerge during data collection. Initial concepts included types of innovation; innovation activities; 
and sources of ideas. These are reviewed in the remainder of this section. Codes relating to 
challenges in the business environment, adaptations, types of digital technology engaged with and 
adoption challenges, perceptions of innovation policies, and suggestions for improvement were 
allowed to emerge during the analysis.  
The OECD identifies three general types of innovation (OECD 2018, 70-73). A product 
innovation is “a new or improved good or service that differs significantly from the firm’s previous 
goods or services and that has been introduced on the market”. Innovations can differ on multiple 
characteristics such as having improved quality, technical specifications, reliability, durability, 
efficiency, affordability, convenience, usability, user friendliness, or having entirely new 
functions. A business process innovation is “a new or improved business process for one or more 
business functions that differs significantly from the firm’s previous business processes and that 
has been brought into use by the firm.” Business processes include production, distribution and 
logistics, marketing and sales, information and communications systems, administration and waste 
management, and product and process development. Improvements can be related to any 
characteristics mentioned for product innovation but also include implementing new business 
strategies, reducing costs, improving quality or working conditions, or meeting regulatory 
requirements. A more radical form of innovation involving both product and business process 




its business to include entirely new products or markets that require new processes, when it 
transitions away from one type of business to an entirely new one, or when it switches business 
models for its products such as by adopting a digital model. 
Innovation activities “include all development, financial, and commercial activities 
undertaken by a firm that are intended to result in an innovation for the firm” (OECD 2018, 68). 
This can include activities conducted both within the firm or by an external organization (ibid., 
86). There are eight main innovation activities:  
• Research and experimental development (R&D) activities include “creative and systematic 
work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge and to devise new applications 
of available knowledge.” R&D can be either basic or applied research, or experimental 
development, and is novel, creative, addresses an uncertain outcome, is systematic, and is 
transferable and/or reproduceable (ibid., 87).  
• Engineering, design, and other creative work activities cover activities similar to R&D but 
do not meet all five criteria for R&D. These can include planning technical specifications, 
testing, evaluation, installing equipment, demonstrations, reverse-engineering, 
development or new forms or functions, and many others. Whereas R&D is inherently an 
innovation activity, engineering, design, and other creative work activities are only 
considered innovation activities if they meet the “new or significantly improved” criteria 
for innovation (ibid., 87-88).  
• Marketing and brand equity activities include market research and testing, pricing 
methods, product placement and promotion, advertising, and development of marketing 
strategies. As with engineering, design, and other creative work activities, marketing and 
brand equity activities are only innovation activities if they meet the “new or significantly 
improved” criteria for innovation (ibid., 88).  
• Intellectual property (IP) related activities include the protection or exploitation of 
knowledge, legal work to apply for register, manage, license out, enforce, sell, etc. a firm’s 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), and activities to acquire IPRs from other organizations. 
IP-related activities are innovation activities if they are tied to a firm’s other innovation 




• Employee training activities include any activity directed to developing a firm’s 
employees’ knowledge and skills. These are innovation activities if they are related to 
learning to use innovations (ibid., 89).  
• Software development and database activities are those related to the acquisition or 
development of software, databases, or related information, collection and analysis of 
information for/in databases, or activities to expand the functions of IT systems. These are 
innovation activities if they are directly related to innovation (ibid., 89-90).  
• Activities related to the acquisition or lease of tangible assets can include the purchase, 
acquisition, lease, or takeover of buildings, machinery, or equipment, or the production of 
those assets. These are innovation activities only when they result in new or significantly 
improved products or business processes (ibid., 90).  
• Innovation management includes “all systematic activities to plan, govern, and control 
internal and external resources for innovation” including how resources are allocated, 
allocation of decision-making responsibilities, collaboration with partners, integration of 
external inputs, monitoring and evaluation activities, etc. (ibid., 91).  
As this study focuses on users of innovation, it is interested in where users get their ideas 
from. The initial sources for ideas include existing employees within the firm, new employees 
within the firm, firms in the same industry, firms in other industries, suppliers, customers, 
consultants, universities or research organizations, educational institutes, and governments or 
regulation (OECD 2018, 139). 
 The results of the analysis are primarily used to identify policy gaps and issues, and to 
make suggestions as to how those issues might be addressed. The study stops short of making firm 
recommendations as evaluating the suggestions against alternatives would be a significant task 







4. Results and Discussion 
This section is divided into three parts, each focusing on one of the three industries of 
study. Each part is introduced by a summary of the industry’s importance in the Canadian and 
Saskatchewanian economies, its innovation performance according to conventional indicators, and 
how the global industry is being affected by the digital transformation and the challenges the 
industry faces. As there are no estimates of the effects of the digital transformation in Canada, the 
significance must be inferred using global estimates and descriptive statistics. Following the 
summaries, the results for each section of the study are presented. These sections discuss recent 
challenges in firms’ business environments, some of the initiatives firms have taken to overcome 
these challenges, their engagement with digital technologies and digital transformation, the 
challenges they have faced in that engagement, and what role they see for public policy in 
overcoming those challenges. 
 
4.1. Mining 
Globally, the mining industry has long been considered a laggard in embracing the digital 
transformation compared to other industries, but this is changing as more companies recognize the 
opportunities presented by digital technologies (World Economic Forum 2017, 9; Young and 
Rogers 2019, 685). Predictive maintenance, automation, remote operation, troubleshooting, 
optimization, platform integration, and worker safety enabled by the application of sensors, big 
data, analytics, cloud computing, virtual reality, and mobile technology are core aspects of digital 
transformation within the industry. The World Economic Forum Estimates that between 2016 and 
2025, the digital transformation in the metals segment of the mining industry and its associated 
value chain alone will have created $189 billion (USD) of value for the mining industry and $130 
billion of value for the metals industry; will have shifted $106 billion of value to customers, 
society, and the environment; will have reduced CO2 emissions by 608 million tonnes; and saved 
976 lives and prevented 44,317 injuries. However, the transformation, if fully implemented, is 
estimated to eliminate over 330,000 jobs globally (World Economic Forum 2017, 24). 
Previous studies have shown that many firms display poor coordination in their digital 
transformation efforts and have not adopted clear strategies or objectives to pursue such a goal. 




governance structures that support investments across the whole firm, investment in platforms and 
other technological foundations, and greater digital capabilities such as employment of data 
scientists (Sganzerla, Seixas, and Conti 2016, 69-70). These are factors that are largely internal to 
the firm. With respect to external factors, governments and communities can help by setting data 
standards and regulations, by setting performance-based indicators by which companies can 
evaluate the effectiveness of digital innovations, and by establishing digital platforms to better 
monitor supply chains and build trust between participants (World Economic Forum 2017, 31).  
 The importance of the mining industry in Canada varies by province and is a critical 
industry in the territories. Figure 4.1 presents the shares of GDP and exports by jurisdiction for the 
mining and quarrying industry at the national, provincial, and territorial levels for 2019. Export 
data may not accurately reflect provincial shares as it reflects where an enterprise is headquartered 
and not necessarily where it operates. Export shares for the territories are shown on the secondary 
axis. Though the mining industry only accounted for 1.7 percent of GDP and 4.7 percent of exports 
in Canada in 2019, there was strong variation across jurisdictions. Mining held a significant share 
of GDP in Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador, and a significant share of exports in the Northwest Territories, 
Figure 4.1: Mining and Quarrying (Except Oil and Gas) Share of GDP and Exports by Jurisdiction 


















Nunavut, and Saskatchewan. In Saskatchewan, mining accounted for 10.0% of GDP and 13.1% of 
exports. Figure 4.2 presents mining’s share of total, Indigenous, and female employment at the 
national, provincial, and territorial levels using 2016 census data. In almost all cases, mining 
accounts for a higher share of Indigenous employment and a lower share of female employment 
than for the overall population. In 2016, the industry accounted for 0.4 percent of overall 
employment, 1.2 percent of Indigenous employment, and 0.1 percent of female employment in 
Canada, and 1.8 percent of overall employment, 2.6 percent of Indigenous employment, and 0.5 
percent of female employment in Saskatchewan. Digital transformation of the mining industry is 
expected to have significant employment impacts as many of the jobs in the industry are low-
skilled and highly routinized. The impact will be disproportionately borne by Indigenous people 
is the North for whom the industry is a primary employer in many communities (Thomson 2016; 
Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada 2018; Mining Industry Human 
Resources Council 2020). 
Between 2015 and 2017, 48.4 percent of mining companies in Canada reported conducting 
any kind of innovation activity compared to 60.4 percent of firms overall (Statistics Canada 
2019b). There are no equivalent statistics at the provincial level. With respect to productivity 
growth, aggregate estimates for the mining and oil and gas extraction sector indicate that for the 
sector as a whole labour productivity declined by an average 0.88 percent per year over the 2000-








Figure 4.2: Mining and Quarrying (Except Oil and Gas) Share of Total, Indigenous, and Female Employment, 2016 




Macdonald 2020, 35). There are no recent detailed estimates of labour productivity growth for the 
mining industry specifically but dated analyses by Bradley and Sharpe (2009a, 16; 2009b, 17) find 
that there was a -1.07 percent compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in MFP for the mining 
industry in the 2000-2006 period. MFP growth in mining fared better in Canada than the United 
States, which saw a -1.68 percent CAGR in MFP, for this period. One possible explanation for the 
poor MFP performance is that the industry had poor innovation performance. However, Bradley 
and Sharpe (2009a, 43) find that the productivity decline in Canada was not due to a lack of 
innovation but was a result of profit-based decision making and expansion of activities into 
marginal resource deposits that were influenced by high resource prices. At the time, the mining 
industry was at the forefront of technological progress. In recent years, the major segments of the 
mining industry in Saskatchewan have experienced a downturn in resource prices and a 
corresponding decline in revenue. This development may have affected the industry’s ability to 
remain on the technological frontier at a critical moment of technological transformation. Since 
high resource prices are no longer sufficient to sustain the prosperity of the industry, 
technologically-enabled productivity growth will be key to sustaining the industry’s well-being. 
The remainder of this section summarizes the findings for mining firms in Saskatchewan. 
Potash and uranium account for a majority of Saskatchewan’s mining industry and the five 
interviews, representing five firms, drawn on in this section primarily represent those areas, though 
one of the participant firms in the uranium industry was diversified into rare metals as well. As a 
result of the low participation rate and the diversity in respondents, saturation was not achieved 
and the results here should not be interpreted as comprehensive. Nevertheless, some convergence 
was observed and there are findings that provide useful direction for public policy. 
Low commodity prices were identified as a significant challenge in recent years in the 
potash and uranium industries.8 For the potash industry, downstream disruption in the global 
agriculture industry from changing weather patterns and extreme weather such as the fires in 
Australia have contributed to this challenge. The problem is further exacerbated by technological 
change such as the shift to precision agriculture, itself a facet of digital transformation in the 
industry, which creates a dynamic market scenario, and by the competitive structure of the industry 
in which potash firms in other countries enjoy regulatory, tax, currency exchange, or other 
 




advantages such as preferable conditions for shipping.9 In the uranium industry the problem is 
driven by an about-face in public attitudes toward nuclear energy following the Fukushima disaster 
in 2011. Prior to this, one participant stated the world was undergoing a nuclear renaissance and 
public interest in nuclear energy was high. Following the disaster, countries around the world 
became averse to nuclear energy and the uranium industry has been struggling ever since.10 Low 
prices are not an issue in the rare metals industry, which faces very high demand. Rather, the major 
challenge in that industry is the domination of the supply chain by Chinese firms, which were 
reported to control over 90 percent of end products using rare earth metals.11 This seems to be less 
of an immediate concern as the firm has been able to rely on this supply chain to maintain 
profitability despite uranium prices being low. It is more likely to be an issue of national security 
in the long term as rare earth metals are a key component in computer-based products and emerging 
products such as electric vehicles.  
Firms are using different strategies to overcome these challenges. In the uranium industry, 
one participant reported their firm has reduced production to preserve their finite resources for 
when prices increase again.12 Firms in the potash industry are adapting using innovation-based 
strategies to reduce costs, improve safety, grow market share, or introduce new products.13 
However, one participant reported that their firm’s efforts have been partially negated by public 
policies that add costs back through tax or royalty increases. Consequently, the firm has increased 
its government outreach to raise awareness of the realities faced in the industry.14 Given that some 
of these changes do not target potash firms specifically, one can expect that this problem is 
experienced across both the potash and uranium industries. 
Digital transformation was identified as an important adaptation strategy by all participants 
in the potash industry and by one participant in the uranium industry.  Participants were hesitant 
to discuss their digital transformation in depth given its importance to competitive advantage but 
were willing to discuss a few important digital innovations in general terms. Most of the initiatives 
were devoted to improving production processes. Machine learning and AI, and automation are 
being adopted in both the potash and uranium industries to optimize production processes and 
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improve maintenance. Companies are implementing these technologies using lessons learned from 
other industries such as vehicle automation or from other parts of the supply chain in which they 
are vertically integrated.15 One participant from a smaller firm had considered adopting machine 
learning for mineral exploration but had decided against it as it was deemed too costly for the 
marginal benefits it would bring.16 This suggests there is increasing returns to scale for this type 
of technology. Technologies such as cloud computing, 3D modelling, and mobile technology are 
also being employed to help employees access data in a more efficient manner and, when used 
with machine learning technology, to improve asset management.17 That digital transformation 
has become an important strategic pillar should not be surprising. One participant pointed out that 
it is impossible to open a mining magazine, attend a conference, or speak with a consultant without 
digital transformation being mentioned.18 However, though most participants were enthusiastic 
about transformation, the process is still in early stages. A key difference between mining in 
Saskatchewan versus technological leaders such as Rio Tinto in Australia is the type of mining 
being done. Whereas much of the mining in Australia, particularly for iron and coal, is done using 
open pits, potash and uranium mining in Saskatchewan takes place in underground facilities. This 
creates technical challenges for innovations relying on internet access or GPS navigation and 
partially explains the lag in adoption by Saskatchewan mining firms. 
Firms are embracing several different strategies to implement their transformations. The 
most developed uses a bottom-up approach where the person responsible for implementing the 
firm’s digital transformation collaborates with general managers that run the mine sites to identify 
directions for transformation and to identify the best way to implement solutions. Once a solution 
has been developed, it can be deployed to other sites. This strategy can help overcome resistance 
from employees and helps preserve accountability by involving the people responsible for 
production and safety in developing the solutions.19 Other companies use a more top-down strategy 
where transformation is driven by the CEO and top management. This strategy requires large 
amounts of industry intelligence and efficient lines of communication to support executive 
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decision making.20 This approach allows for closer integration of innovation with business strategy 
and allows for more control over the allocation of resources. 
Participants identified several challenges that they had experienced with their firms’ digital 
transformations. Challenges with managing the changes were identified in both the potash and 
uranium industries, specifically challenges related to bringing different parts of the company 
together to make the changes possible. One participant in the potash industry recalled that in the 
early stages of their firm’s transformation, different segments of the company would try to take 
charge of an innovation and would get into “turf wars” with each other.21 Another participant in 
the uranium industry reported that their digital transformation was initially hampered by 
communication barriers between data scientists and miners whose different technical backgrounds 
prevented them from being able to discuss problems in a common language.22 In both cases the 
challenges were resolved by having groups continue to work together until common goals were 
defined and a rapport was established, but it required a determined effort. In the latter case, 
exposing each group to the other’s context, such as by having data scientists go down into mines 
to experience the context in which data is generated and having miners work with data scientists 
to learn how data can be used, was an effective method of overcoming the barrier.23 
A related potential challenge mentioned by participants in both industries was resistance 
from employees related to concerns over job loss created by automation. In one case, the problem 
was avoided by holding quarterly town halls where leadership would discuss changes with 
employees. While the participant acknowledged that automation would change the nature of jobs, 
they argued that job loss could be avoided by retraining existing employees with the skillsets 
required by the new jobs. The participant believed that training for skills in this way would create 
employees that were more qualified than employees that were newly hired with the required 
skillsets as the existing employees would have an appreciation for both the manual and automated 
modes of operation.24 However, another participant suggested that automation would reduce the 
number of jobs required. In this case, the firm’s reduced production meant that they had laid off 
many employees already. The participant pointed out that this created a window of opportunity 
where changes could be made with minimal resistance and that no jobs would be lost to the new 
 
20 200316_1505, 6-7; 200429_1428, 5 
21 200228_1257, 5 
22 200429_1428, 4 
23 200429_1428, 4 




technology, only that some jobs would not come back as a result.25 The difference between the 
two cases suggests that in the long term automation will reduce the number of jobs available, but 
the timing of the job loss will depend on decisions made by the firm on how many jobs to retrain 
for and how many to eliminate directly, and the existence of windows of opportunity for when 
those jobs could be eliminated.  
A third challenge involving personnel is related to the perception of what changes are 
possible. One participant recalled that when their firm was first starting out on its digital 
transformation, there were several problems that existing employees and managers at the time 
believed to be impossible to solve. But this changed when the firm hired a new person who brought 
fresh perspective and started collaborating with employees and management and questioning the 
insolvability of the problems in question, eventually working toward solutions for many of them. 
Though the participant stressed that the firm was not lacking in innovative culture before this 
person was hired and that their efforts would not have been successful without a collaborative 
approach, the change in personnel was key in overcoming the barrier created by pre-conceived 
ideas of what was possible.26 
In general, participants emphasized the need for strong leadership, employee involvement, 
and building teams with the right balance of creative and practical skills and rapport as being 
important for developing a coordinated approach and overcoming resistance within the firm.27 But 
these only contribute so far to overcoming technical challenges firms face particularly in the potash 
industry where the unique characteristics of the operating environment prevent firms from directly 
adopting technology being used in other industries. Firms must invest heavily in R&D, software 
development, and engineering to adapt existing technology to the environment. The benefit of this 
is that it avoids problems of integrating off-the-shelf technology with existing platforms and the 
technology can be customized to user needs which can help overcome resistance from 
employees.28 But the rapid pace at which these technologies are evolving and the long 
development times required to adapt them often mean that the products of the development process 
are obsolete by the time they are ready.29 In cases where the products are still relevant, the 
competitive advantage may only be retained for a few years as other companies are working to 
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solve the same problems. Secrecy is therefore the best tool for appropriating the benefits of 
innovation.30 Participants reported using the SR&ED tax credit and funding provided through 
Mitacs, NSERC, Western Diversification, or forming partnerships with university researchers to 
access funding available through the higher education stream to help offset the costs of innovation. 
However, in the latter case, collaboration can lead to conflict over ownership of IP.31  
When asked what role the public sector could play in helping overcome their innovation 
challenges, participants expressed support for more funding for research projects as this can 
determine how many projects they invest in in a given year.32 Two participants took this idea 
further and expressed interest in establishing a mining tech hub to work on technical problems 
faced by mining companies in the province.33 The justification for such a supply-side institution 
is uncertain. Such institutions are normally justified to correct underinvestment in R&D, but 
mining firms are investing heavily in R&D already and there are a multitude of mining industry 
research organizations in Canada. The problem is that these organizations often operate in silos 
(Canadian Chamber of Commerce 2013, 37). The possibility of adding another organization 
should therefore be approached cautiously. A better approach may be to make use of existing 
institutions and build on efforts made by institutions such as the Canadian Mining Innovation 
Council (CMIC) in the last decade to promote greater cooperation between existing institutions 
and industry. With this in mind, there is also merit to having an institution devoted to firms in 
Saskatchewan and the unique problems they face. Saskatchewan Polytechnic’s new Digital 
Integration Centre of Excellence is ideally suited to supporting the industry’s research efforts to 
overcome these challenges. Such an approach can be justified as a counterweight to the 
competitive advantages enjoyed by competitors in other countries. However, given that firms 
within Saskatchewan compete on the basis of technology and the ability to solve problems quickly, 
it may reduce competition within the province. Justification for the policy would require greater 
cost-benefit analysis to determine which scenario creates the greatest returns for firms and the 
public.  
In addition to helping address R&D challenges, two participants expressed interest in 
public support for retraining programs.34 As firms begin to automate more processes, there will be 
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reduced demand for equipment operators and increased demand for a variety of technologists. 
Policy intervention in this are can be justified as offsetting the transaction cost that is created by 
the need for training which may reduce overall investment in technology, and as a means to 
maintain or possibly increase social welfare especially in northern communities where such jobs 
account for a significant portion of employment. Implementing such a policy will require 
leadership from provincial governments which have primary responsibility for education. In 
Saskatchewan, the Polytechnic, again, is ideally situated to act in this area. The institution already 
provides consulting and training to firms in the province and has capacity to provide training in 
both trades and computer skills. Along with the Digital Integration Centre of Excellence, they are 
best suited to consult with industry and other institutions to determine what skills are required and 
to construct appropriate programs. The Polytechnic should therefore be a leading partner, in 
partnership with the provincial government, on consulting with industry, other educational 
institutions, and the federal government to determine what skills are required and to construct the 
subsequent programs, qualification regimes, and funding options. 
Finally, several participants expressed a desire for the public sector to make greater effort 
in providing stability for the industry.35 Investments in mining, whether it is for innovation or 
expanding operations, require large amounts of capital and often have long lead times before 
returns begin to accrue. Having stable regulations, taxes, and royalties can improve the investment 
prospects of the industry. One suggestion to improve stability was to introduce tax and royalty 
schedules with long time horizons so that firms can have an idea of what their financial obligations 
will be several years into the future. Such an approach could be justified as a non-financial measure 
to reduce uncertainty, but carries significant feasibility concerns. The exact time horizon would 
have to be determined through consultation with the industry and, if extending the policy to the 
tax system in addition to the royalty system, would require introducing a parallel tax structure for 
mining firms. Such a policy could also be applied to similar industries, such as oil and gas, that 
experience similarly long lags. Ideally, there would be a legislated limit for how soon a change in 
the schedule can be implemented to give firms time to adjust but this would have to be balanced 
against democratic principles to accommodate changes in governments with differing priorities. 
Though far from comprehensive, the results begin to provide a rough idea of the nature of 
the mining ecosystem in Saskatchewan: Mining firms are both “assemblers” and “users” in the 
 




innovation ecosystem for mining as they purchase generic components and engineer them into 
context-specific digital technologies. The size of the companies means they frequently have the 
technical expertise and financial resources to accomplish much of the innovation themselves. The 
public sector supports this through financial programs targeted toward R&D investment. However, 
there are points for improvement. There is a need for a “champion” or an “entrepreneur” to bring 
together disparate research centres to break down silos and improve information flow. This may 
be accomplished by establishing a new institution with such a mandate or by persuading an existing 
institution to undertake such a task. Though the role the public sector takes on in this project may 
vary, it is a prime actor, or “regulator,” in the area of education. Through curriculum innovation, 
the public sector can support both the industry’s shifting expertise requirements as well as the 
communities most at risk of job displacement. Finally, the public sector can support the industry 
through stable regulations to reduce uncertainty for investments that require decades to pay off. 
 
4.2. Oil and Gas Extraction 
The global oil and gas extraction industry has historically been highly engaged with digital 
technology adoption. Now, the industry is beginning to use cloud computing, IoT, big data, 
analytics, digital twins, augmented and virtual reality, automation, remote operation, mobile 
technology, social platforms, and others to improve decision making, optimize production, enable 
predictive maintenance to improve life-cycle management, improve safety, and better engage with 
customers (World Economic Forum 2017b; Lu et al. 2019). The World Economic Forum Estimates 
that between 2016 and 2025, a scenario of total application of these technologies could produce 
$1 trillion (USD) of value for firms in the oil and gas value chain with $580-600 billion accruing 
to firms in the extraction industry; will produce approximately $640 billion of value to wider 
society from cost reductions, productivity improvements, reducing water usage, and lowering 
emissions; will reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 1.3 billion tonnes and oil spills by 230,000 
barrels; and significantly reduce the number of accidents and injuries. However, the 
transformation, if fully implemented, is estimated to have a net displacement of 35,000 jobs 
globally (World Economic Forum 2017b, 12-25).  
Rather than embracing full transformation and exploiting the full possibilities of new 
digital technologies, much of the progress to date has been incremental and focused on improving 




Many companies are still in the early phases of digital transformation, focusing on digitization of 
existing activities and not yet focusing on how data can be integrated and be used to transform the 
company (Lu et al. 2019, 71). There are several factors that have prevented the industry from fully 
embracing the transformation (World Economic Forum 2017b, 26; Lu et al. 2019, 86). Data 
security and intellectual property regulations have not adapted to networked business models 
where data is shared along a value chain, and integration along value chains remains fragmented. 
The lack of standardization and integration of data across platforms creates uncertainty concerning 
ownership of or access to data. The industry’s conservative culture creates a mistrust of new 
technology among leaders and employees. There is a lack of digital skills in the industry and the 
industry has a poor reputation among many of the younger generations. There are concerns about 
security and the threat of cyberattacks to which new technologies make companies vulnerable.36 
The inherent difficulties in assessing the benefits of many technologies and long lag times between 
implementation and results make it difficult to determine the ROI for new technologies. 
Insufficient supporting platforms and interoperability between technologies can reduce the 
benefits. Finally, companies may not have the financial resources to invest in digital 
transformation. Measures that companies can take to overcome these challenges include making 
digital transformation a priority for executives and developing digital strategies, fostering a culture 
of innovation within their companies by encouraging technology use and exchange of ideas, 
investing in human capital and development programs, continuing to digitize their core 
capabilities, reforming their data architecture, investing in partnerships for innovation, and piloting 
new technologies and sharing results. Governments and communities can help by reforming data 
standards and regulations to encourage sharing, developing partnerships for innovation within 
government, creating regulations to foster a shift to a low-carbon economy, and providing financial 
support for innovation (World Economic Forum 2017b, 27-28; Lu et al. 2019, 86). 
The oil and gas extraction industry in Canada accounts for a significant share of total 
exports and is highly significant in several provinces. Figure 4.3 presents the shares of GDP and 
exports by jurisdiction for the oil and gas extraction industry at the national, provincial, and 
territorial levels for 2019. Though the oil and gas extraction industry accounted for 5.5 percent of 
GDP and 13.4 percent of exports in Canada in 2019, the industry is most significant in Alberta, 
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Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan, representing 14.6 percent of GDP in the latter 
case. As with mining, export data does not accurately reflect provincial shares as it reflects where 
an enterprise is headquartered and not necessarily where it operates. In this case, oil and gas’s 
export share in Saskatchewan appears to be 0.2 percent but many firms operating in Saskatchewan 
are based in Alberta. GDP shares are therefore a more accurate reflection of the importance of the 
industry. Figure 4.4 presents the industry’s share of total, Indigenous, and female employment at 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Statistics Canada (2019a; 2019b; 2019e) 









Figure 4.4: Oil and Gas Extraction Share of Total, Indigenous, and Female Employment, 2016 




Alberta, the industry accounts for less than 1.0 percent of employment for each group in all 
jurisdictions. 
Between 2015 and 2017, 41.3 percent of oil and gas extraction companies in Canada 
reported conducting any kind of innovation activity compared to 60.4 percent of firms overall. The 
most recent detailed productivity estimates for the industry from Bradley and Sharpe (2009b, 17) 
found that in the 2000-2006 period, there was a -6.67 percent CAGR for MFP in the oil and gas 
extraction industry. MFP growth in the industry was worse in Canada than the United States which 
saw a -1.85 percent CAGR in MFP over the period (ibid., 24). As with the mining industry, the 
industry was at the leading edge of innovation during this period, and the productivity decline in 
Canada was a result of high resource prices which induced profit-based decision making and 
expansion into more marginal resources (ibid., 40). However, as with the mining industry, the oil 
price crash of 2014 and the recent oil price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia may have left 
companies without sufficient resources to innovate at a time when they need to most. This also 
comes at a time when demand for fossil fuels is expected to slow and decline, and investors are 
hesitant to invest in the industry. Digital transformation of the industry will be necessary to adapt 
to these challenges and will require proper support. 
 The results for this section come from eight interviews representing seven firms in the oil 
and gas extraction industry. It should be noted that the oil and gas extraction industry in 
Saskatchewan is exclusively conventional oil and gas rather than the oil sands found in Alberta, 
as the two industries employ very different extraction technologies. The industry is currently 
experiencing a business environment that one participant described as the “toughest [the] industry 
has seen in a generation”37 caused by low commodity prices and increased costs. Public policies 
are key in either creating or exacerbating these challenges. 
 The oil and gas extraction industry in Canada has faced a challenging economic 
environment since 2014 when global oil prices fell from over $100.00 per barrel to approximately 
$30.00 per barrel in early 2016. Following the crash, prices remained low as producers struggled 
to clear an excess of product in their inventories. Though there was a slight recovery between 2016 
and 2020, prices crashed again in March of 2020 amid fears that the COVID-19 pandemic would 
trigger a global recession and a price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia (Seskus 2020). These 
 




two events combined to drive oil prices briefly into negative values (Evans 2020). At the time of 
writing, prices have recovered slightly and West Texas Intermediate (WTI), one of the North 
American benchmarks, is trading at approximately $40.00 per barrel.  
The Canadian oil and gas extraction industry faces an even more challenging market than 
the one just portrayed as it trades its oil at a discount to WTI. Figure 4.5 compares the prices 
between WTI and Western Canadian Select (WCS), the Canadian benchmark, from 2014 to April 
2020. Over this period, WCS traded, on average, at a 30 percent discount to WTI (Government of 
Alberta 2020). This can be attributed to lower quality, increased competition from U.S. shale 
producers, and egress challenges leading to higher transportation costs (Oil Sands Magazine 2018). 
Several participants identified the latter problem as the most severe of the three. The lack of 
pipelines has driven many firms to transport their product by rail, but an overall scarcity of capacity 
remains. Firms have had to reduce operations and capital expenditures, and lay off large portions 
of their workforce or reduce hours to reduce costs and avoid shutting down. Overall investment in 
the industry has drastically declined.38 The surplus supply and egress challenges have also shifted 
value capture not only downstream to oil refiners but to oil producers in the United States who are 
taking advantage of arbitrage to purchase inexpensive oil and resell it at the higher world price.  
Federal public policies concerning pipeline project approval have played a key role in creating this 
situation. One participant argued that these policies have been influenced by intense negative 
 































































































































































































Figure 4.5: Oil Prices - West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Western Canadian Select (WCS) 




public opinion towards pipelines and the oil and gas extraction industry from some segments of 
society and are reflective of a political rather than economic approach.39 
The challenges created by low commodity prices are aggravated by an increasingly strict 
regulatory environment.40 Increased reporting requirements for carbon emissions have increased 
overhead costs for firms as they must hire more staff to do the reporting. Participants did not say 
by exactly how much these costs have increased but one participant reported that from the time 
they started working at their company 25 years ago to the present, the composition of the company 
has shifted from being primarily engineers and geologists to primarily administrators and 
accountants. This participant also expressed frustration at the lack of transparency in emissions 
reporting and not seeing any clear purpose to it.41 Increased reporting requirements have increased 
the time required for project approvals and the delay is often enough that by the time approval 
comes through, the window of opportunity for the project has closed and it is no longer viable. 42 
Firms are also challenged to comply with multiple overlapping and often conflicting regulatory 
regimes at the federal and provincial levels, and sometimes across ministries and agencies. This 
diversity creates a burden on companies not only by increasing administration costs to ensure 
compliance, but by forcing companies to spend on multiple redundant tests or measurements 
because regulations often do not recognize the work done to fulfill requirements for other 
regulatory regimes. One participant gave the example of measuring methane emissions which had 
to be done multiple times because the protocols across different regulatory regimes were different. 
Testing as part of the R&D process often suffers from similar complications.43 Aside from the 
problem of multiple regulatory regimes, there is a perceived arbitrariness to some regulations 
within regimes. One participant presented the example of needing a permit to operate a drilling rig 
within a certain distance of an airport, but a permit was not required to operate a maintenance rig 
of similar dimensions. When they tried to report this inconsistency, they found there was no one 
to receive their complaint.44  
 Participants identified several other public policies which are increasing costs in the 
industry. Increasing property taxes, utility rates, and costs imposed both directly and indirectly by 
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the carbon tax reduce firm’s margins and increase the risk of firms exiting the market.45 In 
Saskatchewan specifically, the provincial government began enforcing Directive 17, a piece of 
legislation governing measurement in oil and gas operations, in 2016 with required compliance by 
April 1st, 2020. Directive 17 requires that some older models of measurement devices at well sites 
be replaced with newer models. But replacing the old devices is costly and the enforcement’s 
coincidence with the low oil prices and financial strain created frustration in the industry.46 
 The challenges posed by the regulatory structure and other public policies, though 
challenging in themselves, are primarily additional to the challenges created by low oil prices and 
egress challenges and add to an already intolerable situation. Though firms are responding to these 
challenges in a variety of ways, their primary goal is to reduce costs. Digital innovation through 
automation is a key component to this strategy for most firms, but there are other strategies such 
as reducing power costs and reusing instead of venting well gas that though beyond the focus of 
this study nevertheless have significant enough public policy aspects that they merit discussion. 
These strategies are discussed in the Appendix. The remainder of this section is devoted to 
discussing digital innovation in the industry. 
 Digital transformation in the oil and gas extraction industry is overwhelmingly focused on 
applying remote monitoring and operation systems to well sites, pipelines, and other facilities to 
improve production processes and administration.47 The major benefit of remote monitoring and 
operation is that it reduces downtime. Formerly, when operators drove to well sites to inspect them, 
a problem could occur and a site could spend several days underperforming before it was noticed. 
With remote monitoring, problems can be detected within moments of their occurrence. In some 
instances, operators can fix them remotely, and in cases where the problem cannot be solved 
remotely, operators can be dispatched directly to the site. This practice is much more efficient than 
routine patrols and reduces driving-related safety risks. The improved monitoring helps reduce 
emissions both through improved site management and by reducing vehicle use.48 Remote 
monitoring and operation is strongly supported by machine learning, analytics, and cloud 
databases. Machine learning algorithms add a degree of automation to the system by monitoring 
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sites to determine if the conditions are out of the ordinary and alerting an operator if they are.49 
Analytics can be used to optimize production, improve demand forecasting and logistics, and 
enable predictive maintenance practices.50 Cloud databases act as platforms for analytic systems 
and enable employees to share documentation and communicate more efficiently.51 
Firms use different strategies to implement these technologies. For example, one larger 
firm uses a decentralized approach where different segments of the firm pilot a variety of 
technologies and solutions. The lessons learned are then applied to other segments of the company 
where they are most relevant.52 In another large firm, the activities were somewhat more 
centralized. The workforce and customers are key in generating ideas and creating a demand for 
new technologies, but upper management is responsible for vetting the ideas.53 A participant from 
a smaller firm explained that once the firm decided to implement the technology, it used a strategy 
where the technology is implemented gradually as existing systems need to be replaced.54 Firms 
receive ideas for innovation from a variety of sources including employees within the firm,55 from 
other firms in the industry,56 and by working with suppliers.57 Firms undertook several activities 
in the innovation process itself. Hardware innovation often involved a combination of acquisition 
of existing devices and engineering new ones.58 Software innovation was the same, involving a 
combination of purchasing and development.59 Three participants reported that their firms 
undertook some degree of R&D, in one case to develop new innovations, in another to solve 
technical problems with implementation, and in the third case it was both.60 In many cases, training 
was a key innovation activity for implementation success.61 
Participants identified several innovation challenges, but cost is the most significant. 
Sensor systems for individual sites can cost tens of thousands of dollars to engineer and install and 
this creates different challenges for firms depending on their size. Smaller firms, though they may 
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have only a few dozen sites, struggle to pay the upfront costs of adopting the new technology.62 
Larger companies may have hundreds of thousands of sites and may struggle to bear the 
cumulative costs.63 The size of individual well sites is also a factor. Since the costs of sensor 
systems does not vary greatly with the size of the site, a firm whose sites are larger than average 
will enjoy economies of scale than firms with smaller sites do not receive.64 In addition to the 
systems at well sites and other facilities, firms often must also bear the cost of installing 
communications infrastructure to support the systems.65 Many facilities such as well sites and 
pipelines are in remote areas that do not have high speed connectivity. Without this, remote 
monitoring and its related technologies cannot function. These challenges are all complicated by 
the difficulty of determining the ROI of the system.66 However, the challenge of determining ROI 
has been less of a barrier to innovation than it might be in other industries because the pressures 
faced by the oil and gas extraction industry necessitate the adoption of these systems.67 
The efficiency gains created by remote monitoring and operation may be expected to create 
resistance from employees who are concerned about job loss. However, this does not appear to be 
the case. Remote monitoring has resulted in a more efficient allocation of labour and more 
proactive rather than reactive responses to problems. 68 The technology has necessitated creating 
new operational technologist positions within companies. These technologists interpret the 
feedback from the monitoring systems and dispatch operators to address problems as they arise.69 
The transition to these new roles and learning to use the new technologies in general was reported 
to have created a small amount of discomfort but not outright resistance and was perceived to be 
greater among older employees,70 but this was overcome through collaboration, training, and 
giving employees time to experiment with the new technology.71 In other cases, such as when 
firms were developing data strategies, hiring new employees with the requisite skills was 
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necessary.72 Overall, firms faced minimal resistance from employees in implementing these 
technologies and in some cases reported high employee enthusiasm.73 
Other innovation challenges identified by participants included technical challenges of 
developing the technologies and the associated learning curve, not being fully aware of the 
possibilities created by the new technologies, and having to overcome conservative business 
cultures that had a strong preference for existing practices.74 However, in all these cases, 
participants recognized that the only way to overcome these challenges were to consistently work 
with the new technology and purposefully embrace it. 
When asked if their firm had taken advantage of any public policies to support their 
innovation efforts, most participants reported that their firms had. Only two firms reported not 
taking advantage of innovation policies.75 However, for the firms who had, most of the assistance 
was directed not toward digital innovation but toward other types of innovation. These are 
discussed in the Appendix. For digital innovation, participants used the SR&ED tax credit and its 
provincial counterparts, and the Saskatchewan Petroleum Innovation Incentive (SPII).76 The 
SR&ED tax credit, as discussed previously, is a combination of refundable and non-refundable tax 
credits for money spent on R&D activities. SPII is a royalty tax credit for innovation projects that 
improve oil and gas recovery, manage environmental impacts, increase the value-added in 
processing, or commercialize production by-products or waste. The participant who reported using 
SPII had no complaints about the program, but one participant who used the SR&ED tax credit 
cautioned that applying for the program carried significant administrative burdens. Their firm has 
a team of five people dedicated to dealing with SR&ED tax credit and other government 
applications. They suggested that the need for this expertise and the lag times between application 
and refunds, sometimes taking a year, would be prohibitive to smaller companies applying for the 
program.77 The lags involved also make the program of little use to assist with the upfront costs of 
innovation. 
 Overall, participants identified few areas where public support for digital innovation was 
desired. Most of the suggestions were related to the regulatory environment in general or to 
 
72 200421_1259, 2 
73 200303_1021, 5; 200421_1259, 4 
74 191211_0930, 4; 200421_1259, 2; 200403_1302, 4 
75 200421_1259, 4; 200421_1001, 5 
76 200303_1021, 7; 200401_1033, 7; 191211_1007, 17-18 




challenges experienced in other adaptation streams. The two areas that participants saw a role for 
the public sector in providing assistance for digital innovation were to help establish 
communication infrastructure on which remote monitoring and operation rely, and to provide 
general financial assistance or make reforms to existing financial support programs.  
 Public assistance in establishing communications networks can be justified under the goal 
of improving social welfare and supporting industrial modernization as the networks would 
provide service not only to firms with operations in remote areas but also to rural communities. 
There is an added consideration in Saskatchewan where the entity responsible for developing such 
networks is a crown corporation, SaskTel. As part of the Saskatchewan Capital Plan (Government 
of Saskatchewan 2020b), the provincial government’s economic stimulus package, SaskTel was 
allocated $325 million for 2020 and 2021. Of this, $12 million is earmarked to develop fibre-optic 
networks outside of the nine major centres in the province and $78.9 million is for rural wireless 
enhancement. The corporation has stated that it will make total investments of approximately $1.4 
billion over the next five years (SaskTel 2020b). There is an opportunity at the moment to leverage 
this investment to expand broadband networks into remote areas to support digital innovation. As 
one participant suggested, such investments could be made through capital partnerships with firms, 
reducing the financial burden on any one party.78 Consideration should also be made for SaskTel’s 
role in supporting digital innovation over the long term. At the moment, SaskTel’s focus on digital 
transformation is primarily internal (SaskTel 2020a, 36), but one participant suggested that the 
organization could play a more  active role in supporting digital transformation in the oil and gas 
industry, and others, by leading the infrastructure implementation and creating a strategy or 
division devoted to promoting remote operation and automation technologies.79 Leveraging public 
stimulus spending to expand communications networks and repositioning SaskTel as a leader of 
digital transformation in the province could be critical to promoting not only the province’s 
economic recovery but its long term growth. The window of opportunity for such initiatives will 
only be open for a short time and it is crucial that governments and industry do not let it go to 
waste. 
 In addition to establishing communications infrastructure, there was some interest in 
reforming existing financial assistance programs and in establishing new ones. Though 
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participants that reported using public programs to assist their digital innovation efforts were 
generally satisfied with the programs,80 one participant argued that the SR&ED tax credit 
application needs to be simplified because the complexity of the application requires, in the case 
of the participant’s firm, spend over a hundred thousand dollars applying for the credit.81 Beyond 
the existing programs that provide financial assistance, one participant suggested that targeted 
incentives or grants for adopting specific technologies would be beneficial.82 If the assistance was 
structured so as to be provided before a project is undertaken, this would help address the problem 
of the large upfront costs required for the new technology. 
 As with mining, oil and gas firms operate as both assemblers and users of their digital 
innovations and are able to operate with relative independence. But the public sector’s 
responsibility for communications infrastructure in Saskatchewan makes it a key complementor in 
the innovation ecosystem for digital technologies. However, the public sector, in its regulator role, 
is currently also perceived as an antagonist to innovation and broader economic prosperity. The 
balance between support for and constraint on the industry will need to be balanced with 
environmental, social, and economic goals. The best supports may be those that benefit the sector 




The global construction industry has traditionally been slow to adopt innovations. Some of 
the  reasons for this are the degree to which the industry relies on informal processes, a high degree 
of variability between projects and poor knowledge transfer processes, weak project monitoring, 
a sequential production process that has little room for cross-functional cooperation in planning, 
the lack of collaboration between suppliers and contractors, a relatively conservative innovation 
culture, and little attractiveness for young people with technological skills (World Economic 
Forum 2016, 14-15; Oesterreich and Teuteberg 2016, 123). However there is growing adoption of 
technologies such as equipment and building automation, remote operation, IoT, big data, 
analytics, virtual and augmented reality, drones, 3D printing, and mobile technology to achieve 
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reduced construction costs and times, increase productivity, improve quality, improve safety, and 
improve coordination along supply chains (World Economic Forum 2016, 21-25; Oesterreich and 
Teuteberg 2016, 134; Dallasega, Rauch, and Linder 2018, 208). Building information modelling 
(BIM) is emerging as a key platform for digital technology in construction as both a design, 
planning, and management tool. There are no comprehensive analyses for the construction sector 
as there are for the mining, and oil and gas extraction sectors but Gerbert et al. (2016, 3) estimate 
that full digital transformation of the non-residential construction value chain could lead to annual 
global cost savings of between $1 trillion and $1.7 trillion. There is a strong possibility of 
additional benefits and spillovers as the construction industry serves almost all other industries and 
is responsible for a large portion of the world’s resource consumption, solid waste, and CO2 
emissions (World Economic Forum 2016, 11). 
 In addition to the general barriers to innovation faced within the industry, digital 
transformation adds a unique set of difficulties. Implementation requires considerable expertise 
and sophisticated ICT systems, adoption by project owners and other members of the value chain, 
technological standards for interoperability, and regulations concerning data ownership. 
Companies can overcome some of these challenges through investment in digital expertise, 
establishing departments dedicated to implementing new technology and fostering a culture of 
innovation, work with partners to develop complementary digital capabilities, share expertise to 
encourage adoption by partners, and work with the industry more broadly to establish industry 
standards and benchmarks (World Economic Forum 2016, 25; Oesterreich and Teuteberg 2016, 
135). While these changes may help, there is evidence that companies in some places are applying 
digital technologies to improve existing processes rather than embracing a more comprehensive 
transformation. Comprehensive business strategy reform founded on a data architecture strategy 
is needed to achieve the full benefits (Woodhead, Stephenson, and Morrey 2018, 44). Other 
complementary changes to business strategy such as the use of prefabrication and modularization 
can also facilitate the adoption of certain technologies such as automation (World Economic 
Forum 2016, 22). Governments and communities can help by ensuring complementary 
infrastructure is established, reforming regulations to be permissive of innovation, clarifying 
regulations around data ownership, removing barriers to competition and trade, supporting 
research institutions, investing in ICT infrastructure, providing venture capital for start-ups, 




orientation for procurement (World Economic Forum 2016, 44-48; Oesterreich and Teuteberg 
2016, 135). 
 The construction industry accounts for a non-trivial portion of the economy in each 
province, but a negligible share of exports. However, the importance is understated as it services 
almost all other industries and many of its products are key enablers for the whole economy. Figure 
4.6 presents the shares of GDP and exports by jurisdiction for the construction industry at the 
national, provincial, and territorial levels for 2019. The industry accounted for 7.2 percent of GDP 
and in Canada in 2019, and the share was similar across most jurisdictions. The industry accounted 
for 7.0 percent of GDP in Saskatchewan. The industry had negligible export shares in all 
jurisdictions. Figure 4.7 presents the industry’s share of total, Indigenous, and female employment 
at the national, provincial, and territorial levels using 2016 census data. Construction accounted 
for a substantial share of both total and Indigenous employment in almost all jurisdictions, but 
only a minor share of female employment. In 2016, it accounted for 7.3 percent of overall 
employment, 9.6 percent of Indigenous employment, and 1.9 percent of female employment in 
Canada, and 8.4 percent of overall employment, 10.0 percent of Indigenous employment, and 2.2 
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Figure 4.6: Construction Share of GDP and Exports by Jurisdiction 
 




Between 2015 and 2017, 48.5 percent of construction companies in Canada reported 
conducting any kind of innovation activity compared to 60.4 percent of firms overall (Statistics 
Canada 2019b). With respect to productivity growth, Gu and Macdonald (2020, 35) found that 
labour productivity in the construction industry declined by 0.50 percent per year for the 2000-
2016 period. This was entirely caused by a 0.79 percent per year decline in MFP. There is no recent 
research exploring the causes of this decline. However, research on the global industry suggests 
that a lack of innovation may be contributing. 
 The remainder of this section discusses the results of 11 interviews representing nine 
general contracting construction firms primarily in the civil and commercial construction 
industries in Saskatchewan.  
 The business environment in construction in recent years has been characterized by a 
decline in the number of opportunities available and an increase in competition. The two are 
closely related and are heavily influenced by slowdowns in construction and non-construction 
industries, and by public policy decisions. Though slowdowns in the agriculture and potash 
industries contribute to the increase in competition, respondents were focused on the contribution 
from the slowdown in the oil and gas sector, particularly in Alberta. Firms specializing in 
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Public pipeline policies and the carbon tax are believed to have contributed to this problem.83 The 
civil and commercial construction industries are also facing increased competition from the 
residential construction industry which has been directly affected by the slowdown through 
decreased demand in areas with high oil and gas extraction industry presence, and indirectly 
affected by the general slowdown in the economy which has reduced consumers’ willingness to 
invest in projects. The recent application of provincial sales tax (PST) to construction projects is 
believed to have contributed to this as well.84 A reduction in public infrastructure investment in 
recent years has increased competition between civil and commercial construction firms as well, 
particularly between large and small firms who are now competing for smaller projects.85 The 
intensity of competition has set the industry on a “race to the bottom,” 86 as one participant 
described it, where competitors frequently bid for jobs at a loss to retain workers and cash flow.87 
This has reduced profitability for many firms.88 In addition to their indirect effects through the 
market, public policies such as the carbon tax and bonding regulations directly impact firms.89 The 
way in which bonding status is currently regulated is particularly concerning as it is central to 
many civil construction firms’ business strategies, allowing firms to bid on large civil projects. 
Once the status is lost, it is very difficult to get it back because the firm is not able to compete for 
the projects it is specialized in. One participant reported that the lack of opportunity and increased 
competition in the industry had reduced their financial performance and caused their firm and 
several others to lose bonding status in recent years.90 
 Firms are responding to these challenges in several ways. Two firms reported using 
diversification as a strategy. This included diversifying into other regions, other areas of 
construction, or, in the case of some large firms, targeting smaller projects. Some firms have gone 
so far as to diversify into entirely other areas of business.91 Two firms have not diversify but started 
acting more strategically, bidding on jobs they feel they are more competitive in, allocating their 
resources to urban areas to take advantage of a greater number of opportunities there, or forming 
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partnerships with other companies to ensure a supply of work.92 Two firms reported laying off 
personnel in addition to these adaptations.93 These strategies are primarily used by smaller firms. 
With respect to digital technologies, no smaller firms reported digital innovation as a strategy, but 
three larger firms identified automation, software upgrading, and adoption of new construction 
technologies generally as being important to adapting to challenges in the business environment.94 
 Participants most often reported that their firms were applying digital technologies to 
improve information management and communication systems, production processes, and project 
administration. Only three firms, all of which were identified as small firms, reported not 
implementing any type of digital innovation in recent years. However, even in innovative firms, 
much of the innovation is in the early stages and is primarily concerned with digitizing existing 
processes rather than transforming the firm around the new capabilities. Project management 
software was the most commonly reported innovation. The software is used throughout the 
tendering and estimation, and construction phases to reduce paperwork, manage records, and 
improve data mobility and collaboration.95 This is the extent of digital innovation in most small 
firms though most use some form of digital drawing software and computer assisted estimation, 
and some use cloud databases for records management.96 Larger firms are experimenting with 
other technology such as BIM, drones, 3D modelling, IoT, equipment automation, remote 
monitoring, and predictive maintenance.97 BIM is closely related to project management as it 
allows for improved collaboration with project stakeholders and allows a firm to identify potential 
conflicts early on in the planning process. Drones are useful tools for surveying, progress reporting, 
and capturing data which can be used for modelling and design. IoT sensors enable improved 
monitoring for work sites and structures. Equipment automation enables more precise work and 
greater ability to monitor and report progress. Remote monitoring of equipment enables predictive 
maintenance and improves equipment lifecycles.  
New or improved software was overwhelmingly the most common innovation and every 
firm reporting some degree of digital innovation reported either purchasing software or, in the case 
of some larger firms, developing software internally. Most innovative firms reported conducting 
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extensive training and innovation management activities to educate their employees and support 
their innovation efforts. No firm reported conducting R&D activities, engineering and design, or 
other innovation activities. Suppliers are a key source of ideas in a majority of innovative firms. 
Social media and trade show were important channels of communication between suppliers and 
firms. Employees, both new and existing, and other construction firms were also identified as a 
source of ideas in two cases. Other sources mentioned in at least one case included consultants, 
customers, and industry associations. Universities, research and educational institutes, and 
government was not mentioned as a source of ideas in any case. 
 While larger firms are beginning to embrace digital technologies, there are many 
challenges that prevent both larger and smaller firms from adopting these technologies. In the pre-
adoption phase, when firms are searching for technological solutions, the large variety of solutions 
creates challenges in identifying and selecting the solution best suited to addressing a firm’s 
problems. Participants explained that there are hundreds of solutions currently available on the 
market, and the available technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace.98 Selecting the most 
suitable solution requires a substantial vetting process which poses a significant challenge for firms 
of all sizes but more so for smaller firms who often lack the resources or expertise to know which 
solutions best meet their needs and understand the implementation requirements such as 
integration, training, and activities related to use such as data entry.99 Firms used several vetting 
strategies to cope with these challenges including finding out what solutions competitors were 
using and then trialling solutions, striking committees involving personnel from several different 
parts of the organization to deliberate on solutions then experimenting to find out which worked 
best, and, in the case of a larger firm, decentralizing the process to different branches of the firm 
and then testing several solutions to decide which are most suitable to be implemented across the 
firm.100 
 Once possible solutions had been identified, firms reported facing significant financial and 
time costs in adopting the technologies. This was the most significant barrier to adoption for 
smaller firms and was the deciding factor in the three cases of non-adoption. The time costs are 
apparent throughout the adoption process such as in the vetting and selection phase, and in the 
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implementation phase when firms have to allocate time and resources to training.101 The latter is 
discussed further in the next paragraph. However, participants stressed the significance of the 
challenges of high upfront financial costs of acquiring solutions and subsequent yearly 
subscription fees.102 One participant suggested there are increasing returns to scale for some 
solutions, and that smaller firms might not produce at the point where the benefits created by a 
solution outweigh the costs.103 The cost challenges of adopting new technology are compounded 
by the increased competition and fewer opportunities, especially for large projects, in the business 
environment. One participant suggested that the lack of large projects in Saskatchewan combined 
with the financial costs of adoption has prevented the widespread adoption of BIM in the 
province.104 The decision to adopt is further complicated by uncertainty over the future of the 
industry which makes it difficult to justify large investments, and the industry’s largely 
conservative culture which makes it hesitant to adopt new technology.105  
Once a firm has decided to adopt a technology, it faces challenges of adoption by its 
employees. Training and acquiring the relevant skillsets are key components of implementation in 
the construction industry. Some technologies such as BIM or drones require skillsets for which 
there are specific education streams from which a firm can hire.106 But most technology requires 
employee training for implementation to be successful and determining how to structure that 
training can be a challenge.107 Participants from two firms provided detailed accounts of their 
processes. In the first case, the firm implemented a new software in stages, first training office 
staff who then trained field staff. To balance training with day-to-day responsibilities, training 
sessions provided by the software supplier were conducted for one or two hours per week over a 
six-month period. Office staff then provided training to field staff on an ad hoc basis, training them 
in the aspects of the software that they needed to know. Field staff could also take a certification 
program through the supplier to train them in the aspects of the software most relevant for their 
job. The certification program was not made mandatory. This strategy allowed the firm to 
implement the software without overwhelming employees and overcame the problem of having 
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their field staff being dispersed and unable to attend comprehensive training all at once.108 In the 
second case, the firm introduced semi-automated equipment into its operations. The equipment 
was initially not used for several years because the employees at the time were busy with other 
responsibilities and were overwhelmed when they tried to learn the new equipment. To overcome 
this, the firm hired a person specifically tasked to learn to use the equipment, to train operators and 
supervisors, and to devise a data management strategy. By doing so, the firm was able to overcome 
resistance from the employees who are now highly enthusiastic about using the equipment, though 
the whole process took several years to be self-sustaining.109  
 Resistance from employees who were overwhelmed or too busy to learn to use the new 
technology was commonly reported. There tended to be more perceived resistance from older 
employees than younger employees, but this was not always the case. Younger employees also 
often had difficulty adopting the technology and older employees were sometimes the ones with 
the experience to see the benefit of new technology.110 In each case, training was key in 
overcoming the issue. Allowing employees to experiment with the new technology was frequently 
cited as a key complement to training.111 However, one participant suggested that the variety of 
technology can be a source of frustration for employees moving between firms who have to 
repeatedly learn to use new technologies that differ slightly from ones used at their previous firms 
of employment.112 Throughout the entire adoption process, but especially in cases where training 
itself may be a source of resistance, strong support from leadership is key to implementation 
success. In some cases, strong leadership may entail communicating with employees that adoption 
is a priority and providing adequate resources for training and implementation.113 In two cases in 
this study, a change of leadership to personnel who were more enthusiastic or knowledgeable about 
new technology was required to ensure proper support.114 Conversely, in one of the cases where a 
firm was a non-adopter, the leadership had enjoyed a tenure of several decades and was skeptical 
toward new technologies.115 
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 Even after adoption and implementation, many technologies such as BIM or some project 
management software require adoption by other firms to achieve the network benefits. However, 
other firms face the same challenges outlined previously and the need for adoption by partners 
introduces new challenges. The uncertainty factor in new technology, the initial decrease in 
productivity, and the conservative culture in the industry make some firms hesitant to adopt a 
system unless it is already widely adopted in the industry.116 Even if other firms and clients adopt 
the system, not all of them may have the same skill level, requiring time to bring partners to a 
similar level before achieving the full benefit of the system.117 There are also concerns over 
liability and data ownership, or over who is responsible for managing the overall project.118 
Overall, firms appeared to be occupied with addressing internal challenges to adoption, but one 
firm stated it was trying to overcome the need for adoption by partners by proactively persuading 
others to adopt. Progress to date was reportedly slow.119 Another participant speculated that there 
was an aggregation occurring among software suppliers and that once a company became 
dominant, and a technology became standard, then firms would be more willing to adopt.120 
 Though no participants reported that their firms had taken advantage of existing innovation 
policies, participants from all firms were able to identify a role for the public sector in overcoming 
these challenges. One of the most desired roles was for change leadership which had several 
different facets for different actors. The most highly desired form of support was for information 
on available software to reduce the burden of research on firms. Most participants believed this 
role was best suited to industry associations. Financial supports provided by governments for 
technology adoption was identified as an important compliment to information supports. Other 
possible roles for governments included using public procurement to promote technology 
adoption, providing increased financial support to polytechnics for applied research and extension, 
introducing a certification system for construction skills, introducing a harmonized tendering 
system, increasing transparency in awarding projects, investing in infrastructure projects, and 
using best-value approaches.  
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Participants suggested that information supports could include information about the 
software available on the market and on how to onboard the new software once acquired.121 Most 
participants suggested that this role is best suited to industry associations though one participant 
cautioned that this may give too much influence to association leaders who may use it to further 
their self interest either advertently or inadvertently.122 Bearing this in mind, and other 
considerations such as the scale of the task that reviewing available software entails, and that such 
a review would be beneficial not only in Saskatchewan but also in other provinces, the Canadian 
Construction Association is best positioned to facilitate such a review. The Association already 
has a mandate to support innovation within the industry and has a large network through which to 
distribute the workload for the initial review. The first step is to work with provincial and local 
construction associations to develop a broadly accepted group of evaluation criteria to evaluate the 
programs.123 A comprehensive list of existing programs would then need to be developed and 
divided among industry association members to undertake the review. In this way, each program 
could be reviewed multiple times while reducing the burden on and the influence of any single 
firm.  
Some firms suggested that governments could offer financial supports such as rebates or 
tax incentives to incentivize technology adoption by firms.124 This recommendation has also been 
made by the Canadian Construction Association (2020). However, there are several considerations 
relevant to the provision of such supports. The first is that it is the upfront cost which most firms 
struggle with. Rebates and tax incentives would therefore only serve to benefit firms already in a 
position to adopt. A public loans system or investment bank would be a more suitable tool to 
overcoming this challenge but at the present time the economic environment and financial state of 
the provincial government in Saskatchewan makes these options unadvisable. This would also not 
address the problem faced by many small firms where their small scale of operations means many 
technologies are more costly than beneficial. A compromise between the two options is to take an 
indirect approach and invest more in infrastructure projects to increase the number of opportunities 
directly and to stimulate economic activity in the province, courses of action that were in 
themselves desired by participants.125 This approach is also more easily justified as it can 
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contribute to improving social wellbeing, where industrial upgrading is a secondary outcome. The 
$3.1 billion in capital investment announced in the 2020-21 provincial budget (Government of 
Saskatchewan 2020a) and projects such as the $4 billion irrigation project at Lake Diefenbaker 
(Government of Saskatchewan 2020c) help accomplish this goal. With this in mind, financial 
measures incentivizing technology adoption could be used as a signalling tool and to guide 
investment. Given the dominance of software in construction innovation, a challenge would be 
determining which investments were eligible. The software review could serve as a basis for 
determining eligibility. 
The large infrastructure investments present a window of opportunity for the provincial 
government to make digital transformation a priority in its procurement strategy. SaskBuilds, the 
agency responsible for infrastructure procurement in Saskatchewan, considers innovative solutions 
as a factor in its best value procurement policy (SaskBuilds 2015), but the policy is focused on 
innovations in procurement solutions, not necessarily in underlying technologies. By including 
explicit consideration for use of certain technologies, the government can act as a sophisticated 
buyer to drive innovation within the industry. As one participant argued, once the public sector 
has adopted new design and communication systems such as BIM and a critical mass has been 
established, firms can begin to offer those services to other clients.126 The Government of Alberta 
implemented such an initiative, the Digital Project Delivery requirements, in 2018 to encourage 
the adoption of BIM in the construction industry, the end goal being to improve management of 
public infrastructure assets. This could serve as a model for a similar initiative in Saskatchewan. 
However, such a program would have to include supports to overcome the challenges associated 
with technology adoption, most specifically the financial cost of adoption, training, and integrating 
the technology into the firm. Without these supports, imposing technological requirements in 
procurement will create a barrier for firms who lack the resources or expertise to adapt.127 Even 
so, without other supports to offset the costs related to maintaining the technology such as yearly 
fees, such a program could discriminate against smaller firms. A small change that could be made 
as a precursor to more radical changes in procurement would be to give more weight to innovation 
and technology use as part of best value when awarding projects. This would act as a signal to 
firms that digital innovation is a priority.  
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 A related need for policy change in the way the provincial government and crown 
corporations do procurement was identified in one case.128 The participant expressed frustration 
with the variety of bidding platforms through which government organizations tendered projects. 
The variety imposes additional costs on potential bidders who have to either pay a subscription fee 
to multiple bidding platforms or be forced to pay for each bid if they are not subscribed to the 
platform. Harmonizing platforms between government organizations and Crown corporations will 
help to reduce these costs. The participant also expressed frustration with the lack of transparency 
in how Crown corporations award projects. Without feedback on why a bid was rejected or another 
bid was accepted, firms cannot adjust their strategies to improve. Increasing transparency can help 
firms improve and further boost the signal from policy change putting more emphasis on 
innovation in the best-value awards system. Though these policy changes are more related to 
innovation in the public sector, they would also improve feedback processes and help firms 
identify directions for improvement.  
 There were two suggestions for changes with respect to education and educational 
institutions. One participant argued that the lack of professional designations within the industry 
limited opportunities for advancement and effectively signalled that education and skills were not 
a priority within the industry.129 Introducing regulation to professionalize more occupations in the 
industry would allow for greater recognition of skills and greater signalling of qualifications for 
employees who are switching jobs, facilitate continuous learning, and provide a basis for 
identifying, integrating, and training the skills required by new technologies. Polytechnics will be 
key to implementing such a change. One participant also suggested that polytechnics have a role 
to play in promoting technology adoption in the industry by performing applied research and 
delivering extension programs. 130 The recently established Digital Integration Centre of 
Excellence at Saskatchewan Polytechnic is ideally suited to this role. 
 The benefits of using a perspective informed by innovation ecosystems is more apparent 
for the construction industry than for mining or oil and gas extraction. Construction firms are 
often users of new technologies and do not play a significant role in technology development. 
However, unlike mining and oil and gas extraction firms which tend to be large and endowed 
with considerable resources, construction firms are often small and constrained in their ability to 
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innovate. The greatest barrier is the large number of technologies available. This creates 
challenges as firms lack the capacity to sort through all the options and must often invest in 
learning to use multiple technologies. It also prevents the firms from achieving optimal network 
benefits from widespread adoption. Institutions such as industry associations can support this 
innovation ecosystem by taking on a change leadership role. This mostly involves performing 
research on the technologies available and providing informational resources to help firms 
evaluate which solutions best suit their needs. The public sector can support the ecosystem by 
investing more in large infrastructure projects, increasing cash flow in the industry and 
increasing firms’ ability to invest in new technology. Procurement projects can also be structured 
to nudge firms toward new technologies. Other complementary initiatives such as harmonizing 
procurement platforms, providing feedback on why bids were selected or rejected, and 
introducing regulation to improve professionalization within the industry can further improve the 
ecosystem by reducing the burden on firms, improving learning opportunities, and creating 





5. Conclusions and Limitations 
 If conventional indicators are to be believed, decades of public policy intervention have 
appeared to produce little success in improving Canada’s innovation performance. This study has 
argued that this may be because current models of innovation on which policy is based miss 
important factors in the innovation process and that a new model is needed. Taking inspiration 
from the innovation ecosystems model, it argues that more attention needs to be given to firms and 
the problems they experience, rather than systemic factors, and to the demand-side of the 
innovation process. Though the innovation problem narrative primarily exists at the national level, 
this study focused on firms in the mining, oil and gas extraction, and construction industries in the 
province of Saskatchewan. These industries were chosen because of their poor performance on 
conventional innovation indicators. The sub-national focus was chosen primarily for feasibility 
but is not believed to detract from the main argument as the province is also generally considered 
to have poor innovation performance, and provincial innovation policies have a strong supply-side 
focus. The study focused on digital innovation and digital transformation within firms. Digital 
transformation is believed to already be a disruptive phenomenon and will continue to be more so 
in the future. However, if managed properly it may also be a key tool in addressing other disruptive 
trends such as the shift in global economic activity to East Asia, ageing populations, and 
sustainability. Data was collected through interviews with senior managers with knowledge of 
their firm’s digital innovation and digital transformation initiatives.  
 Despite operating in different industries, mining, oil and gas extraction, and construction 
firms in Saskatchewan face several similar challenges in the business environment and for both 
discrete cases of digital innovation and broader digital transformation. All three industries are 
experiencing significant financial pressures from low commodity prices or a lack of projects and 
public policy has played a role in either creating or aggravating this situation. While this has 
created a strong incentive to innovate, it has undermined firms’ ability to do so. Firms are adopting 
cost-reduction strategies such as reducing production, laying off employees, and various 
innovation strategies to cope with this challenge. The priority given to digital innovation and 
digital transformation varies across firms and across industries with larger firms. Firms in the 
mining and oil and gas extraction industries generally had greater capacity for innovation and 
placed higher priority on it than firms in the construction industry. However, the relatively limited 




industry, and this study produced evidence that there is an imbalance between the number of 
options for innovation and the capacity to evaluate those options. Statistical analysis would be 
required to determine if the size effect or the industry effect is more influential.  
 There is a high degree of similarity in the digital technologies being adopted across 
industries. IoT, machine learning, cloud computing, analytics, mobile technology, and varying 
degrees of remote operation and automation were reported in all three industries, though they 
appear to be more prevalent in larger firms and in mining and oil and gas extraction. In 
construction, innovation is overwhelmingly focused on software for project planning and 
management. There was no dominant strategy for implementing the new technology and firms 
varied greatly in the degree to which their strategies could be classified as top-down or bottom-up 
and centralized or decentralized. However, one common theme that emerged was the need to have 
enthusiastic personnel in positions of authority and responsibility to ensure implementation 
success. The need to replace personnel in these positions, often with new employees hired from 
outside the company, to ensure the right person or people were in place was repeatedly raised by 
participants. The importance of these implementation and change management strategies in the 
success or failure of digital transformation makes this an important area for future research.  
 There were several common digital innovation challenges that appeared across all three 
industries. The most significant was the matter of the cost of implementation. These include costs 
of identifying and researching technologies, developing or acquiring them, training employees, 
and, in some cases, follow-up costs such as yearly fees for software. Participants in each industry 
suggested that many technologies have scale effects and that for many smaller firms, the benefits 
of the new technology do not outweigh the upfront costs required to implement them. The scale 
effect does not necessarily vary with firm size but by the size of the projects a firm undertakes or 
by the size of its facilities. Another common challenge was overcoming resistance from 
employees. Surprisingly, the most significant source of resistance was not concerns over job loss 
caused by technological upgrading, but was discomfort with learning a new technology. Firms 
most often managed this issue by providing training, often for several months, and allowing 
employees to experiment with the new technology, with management providing encouragement, 
signalling the importance of adoption, and taking employees concerns seriously. The findings on 




this study primarily came from senior management who may have very different perceptions of 
employee attitudes than the employees themselves. 
 In addition to these common challenges, participants identified several industry-specific 
challenges. The need for rural communications networks was a significant challenge for oil and 
gas extraction firms, and both mining and oil and gas extraction firms experienced significant 
technical challenges in their development and implementation processes. Construction firms, 
particularly smaller ones, commonly reported a lack of research capacity and struggled to evaluate 
software that would be suitable for their firms. The networked nature of much of the software 
made adoption by partners a significant challenge in the construction industry. 
 Taking a firm-based perspective inspired by innovation ecosystems and developing 
policies from the bottom up identified several policy directions that may not have been identified 
using traditional frameworks. Some solutions, such as the desire for financial assistance for 
research or technology adoption, or stronger supports for training and reskilling were shared across 
industries and are typical innovation supports. Others were unique to the circumstances faced in 
the industry. One suggestion from a mining industry participant was to establish a research hub to 
help overcome some of the technical challenges experienced by firms in the province. Participants 
in the oil and gas industry expressed a desire for greater public support in establishing 
communication networks to enable remote monitoring and operation. These suggestions too are 
not novel. Part of this is because mining and oil and gas extraction firms tend to have considerable 
resources and operate on both the supply and demand side of the innovation process. As both the 
developers and users of their innovations, they can address many of the demand-side issues from 
the supply side and avoid difficulties later in the process. However, the perspective has great value 
in industries dominated by small firms, such as construction. Participants in the construction 
industry suggested the public sector could provide information support by identifying and 
evaluating software on the market to make up for firms’ low research capacity and help them make 
decisions about the best technology to adopt. In addition to policy supports for digital innovation, 
participants offered suggestions for policy changes that would improve the conditions for 
innovation generally. For example, investing in infrastructure projects or pipelines would help 





 These suggestions provide a foundation by which the public sector can begin to support 
digital innovation and digital transformation in these industries. Each of them will require more 
thorough consultation and analysis to determine desirability and viability but there is one 
considerable barrier that merits discussion here. The current financial strain that the public sector 
is experiencing as a result of COVID-19 and the downturn in the economy would normally make 
any new policy initiatives undesirable as governments go on the defensive to reduce economic 
losses. But not necessarily in this case. Presently, the Government of Saskatchewan budgeted $3.1 
billion for capital investment in 2020-21 to stimulate economic recovery in the province. There 
exists a window of opportunity where the government can leverage the stimulus spending to shift 
the provincial economy in a direction that makes digital transformation a pillar of economic 
recovery and growth. Many of the policy directions identified in this study are aligned with 
stimulus spending and achieving them is a matter of directing the spending to align with them. 
Other initiatives require a longer time frame to implement and require that institutions such as the 
Digital Integration Centre of Excellence and industry associations become more involved. Taking 
advantage of this opportunity can help set Saskatchewan on a path of digital transformation and 
make the province a model to emulate.  
The discussion around public policy support for digital innovation and digital 
transformation is still largely premature at both the provincial and federal levels. Publications from 
the Government of Saskatchewan and industry associations give little indication that digital 
transformation is a priority. There is somewhat more emphasis from the Federal Government and 
high level plans such as the Innovation and Skills Plan (Innovation, Science, and Economic 
Development Canada 2019, iv-v) and the Economic Strategy Tables (Innovation, Science, and 
Economic Development Canada 2018, 12-20) have begun to indicate awareness of the need for 
digital skills and supporting infrastructure, but there is nothing in the way of detailed industry 
plans and most of the support is oriented toward research. However, firms, at least in the industries 
of study, are for the most part very interested in digital innovation, though digital transformation 
is still in early stages. The findings presented here provide a starting point for possible government 
interventions than can support digital innovation and spur digital transformation at a time when 





Though this study provides several insights on how to support digital transformation, it has 
several limitations. First, the study only focuses on three industries in one province. The same 
industries in other jurisdictions may experience different challenges than the ones found here and 
may require different types of public policy intervention. Other industries will almost certainly 
have entirely different needs and more work will be needed to identify those needs and determine 
appropriate policy interventions. Second, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, this study failed 
to achieve saturation in the industries of study. Despite achieving a degree of convergence in all 
three industries, the results reported cannot be taken as comprehensive even within the industries 
of study. Third, the self-selection procedure used in this study likely skewed the sample toward 
firms that are engaging in digital innovation. This study is therefore only able to provide limited 
insight on why firms may not be engaging in digital innovation and what barriers may be 
preventing them from doing so. Fourth, as mentioned previously, the individuals participating in 
this study were primarily managers in vide-president or director positions. Their views on such 
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Appendix: Additional Findings 
 In addition to the findings related to digital innovation and public policy, participants also 
discussed other issues that, while not related to digital innovation, are strongly related to public 
policy. There were also two participants whose firms did not meet the exact industry criteria for 
inclusion despite being invited to participate through the participant search strategy. In the interest 
of honouring participants’ concerns and their interest in participating in the study, these views and 
cases will be discussed here. 
 
A.1. Mining 
 The search for mining industry participants resulted in the inclusion of a participant whose 
firm produces a potash by-product rather than the mineral itself. Unlike other mining participants, 
who reported experiencing significant challenges resulting from low commodity prices, this 
participant reported that their firm faced few challenges in the business environment as their 
market had stable supply and demand for the foreseeable future.131 However, the firm has in recent 
years adopted new smart logistics systems which have greatly increased the efficiency with which 
they can supply product to their customers. The new system is based on a cloud database that 
gathers data from IoT networks. The networks enable the firm to track its shipments and to 
remotely monitor the inventories of their customers using cameras and analytics programs which 
notify the firm when resupply is needed. This allows the firm to smooth out their distribution of 
shipping over time instead of having high and low intensity periods of resupply. 132 The new 
system has also enabled the firm to optimize performance and reduce costs using analytics to 
determine ideal load sizes, levels of production, where new warehouses may be required, and 
general allocation of resources.133  
The new system was implemented using a top-down approach and encountered some 
resistance from some of the long-term employees who were disinclined to learn to use the new 
system. The firm was able to overcome this resistance by having some early adopters who 
championed for the new system and encouraged others to use it. However, there were several 
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employees who remained resistant and these were eventually replaced.134 The employees who 
adopted the new system reportedly did so with ease as the skills required for the old system 
transferred well. There was some difficulty in learning how to use the analytics side of the system 
and the data that was being generated. This was reportedly overcome through perseverance and 
continued support from upper management.135 The greatest challenge experienced with the new 
system was having customers see the value in it and want to adopt it. Though the benefits for the 
supplier were significant, customers are divided on how much value the system creates and faced 
difficulty determining whether the returns would exceed the costs. The firm is currently beta 
testing the system with its customers and trying to determine an appropriate valuation of the 
system, but the participant suggested that the system might become a mandatory part of the firm’s 
contracting.136 
The participant stated that the firm has not taken advantage of any innovation policies in 
implementing this technology, and that they were not aware that any existed. They did not believe 
that any public intervention was needed to help them overcome the challenges they faced and that 
it was management’s responsibility to resolve them.137 
 
A.2. Construction 
As in the search for mining participants, the search for participants in the construction 
industry resulted in the inclusion of a participant whose firm operated in the commercial retail real 
estate development and property management industry, downstream from construction itself. The 
greatest problem faced by the firm is downstream disruption in the retail sector as more customers 
shop online and fewer brick-and-mortar retailers are able to afford rent.138 The firm has prioritized 
building automation as a means to improve efficiency and reduce costs through improved energy 
management, and to improve customer service.139 These systems are not new to the industry, 
having been used since at least the 1980s, but are ever-increasing in sophistication and have long 
been considered a key pillar of competition.140 The IoT systems underpinning the new technology 
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allow for improved remote monitoring of building environments, allow operators to troubleshoot 
problems as they arise, and enable optimization through analytics. The greatest challenge 
experienced with the new systems are the cyber-security risks. To reduce risk, the firm isolates its 
operational and enterprise systems from each other and has hired a third party specializing in 
security to assist with operations management and developing security protocols such as restricting 
systems access to specific individuals, and to educate employees about cyber-security risks.141 The 
participant was uncertain if the firm had taken advantage of any innovation policies but believed 
there may be a role for the public sector to provide financial incentives or assistance for cyber-
security education.142 
 
A.3. Oil and Gas Extraction 
In the oil and gas extraction industry, digital innovation was one strategy firms were using 
to reduce costs, but several participants also discussed efforts to capture gas produced at wells and 
either sell it or use it to generate power instead of flaring. This helps firms’ financial situation 
either by increasing revenue or reducing power costs and helps them stay in compliance with 
increasingly strict regulations governing carbon emissions levels.143 However, there are technical 
challenges with using gas for power generations and policy barriers that prevent firms from selling 
the gas or the power if they are able to successfully generate it. When generating power, gas is 
often contaminated with water, CO2, and various hydrocarbons. Unless a miniature refinery is 
installed, generators will foul and stop working but this solution is often prohibitively expensive. 
In cases where the gas is clean enough to produce power without extra processing, wells will often 
not produce enough gas or will not produce consistently enough for power generation to be 
economical as the costs imposed by SaskPower on firms seeking to produce power are significant. 
In addition to the cost of installing generators, one participant reported that the cost of grid 
upgrades at facilities were prohibitively high, running up to $100,000 in the example given. These 
costs would have required between five to seven years to pay off, assuming that the well’s gas 
performance remained consistent, which is often not the case.144 In cases such as these, firms may 
choose not to sell the power to the grid and use it for another purpose locally, or they may choose 
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to sell the gas directly. But selling the gas faces similar problems as it usually requires pipelines 
and the cost of installation can be in the millions.145 
Participants expressed frustration in the face of these challenges as they are facing 
increasing pressure from regulations to reduce emissions but are trapped by other public 
institutions who, at least in Saskatchewan, have monopolies on power generation and energy 
distribution but who are seemingly not willing to share the costs of reducing emissions.146 One 
participant expressed concern that such initiatives may be counterproductive as the emissions 
embedded in manufacturing and constructing pipelines or power generation facilities may be 
greater than the emissions created by the well sites as they are now.147 Participants also expressed 
a general frustration with SaskPower which is reportedly very difficult to engage with when 
proposing power generation projects.148 One participant recalled an experience when their firm 
was attempting to install a power generation facility at one of their sites, and they received an 
approval from SaskPower but then received a notification from another department of which they 
had not been made aware that the project had not been approved by them.149 This suggests a degree 
of institutional fragmentation and a lack of communication between departments within the crown 
corporation. Not surprisingly, participants expressed a desire for streamlining of this approval 
process. 
Participants expressed a desire for a rationalization of the regulatory environment 
generally.150 As mentioned in the oil and gas findings, participants reported operating under 
multiple and often conflicting regulatory regimes. The examples given in this section demonstrate 
how some of these conflicts can directly undermine important goals such as reducing carbon 
emissions. With this goal in mind, one participant suggested that such rationalization should be 
undertaken with the idea of the role of oil and gas a part of an energy system which includes 
renewable and nuclear energy sources rather than pitting sources against each other. Only by doing 
this, they argued can Canada effectively reduce its carbon footprint. 151 Another participant 
suggested a strategy that would be a part of this and that is increasing advocacy by governments 
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You are invited to participate in a research study entitled: Innovation and Attitudes 
Toward Digital Technologies in Traditional Industries in Saskatchewan   
  
Project leaders: Aaron Hertes, MPP Student 
  
Summary of the Project: 
The study in which you have been invited to participate is concerned with investigating how 
businesses in traditional industries in Saskatchewan are planning to respond to emerging digital 
technologies such as cloud computing, Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, and the 
continuing automation of production processes. These technologies are expected to drastically 
improve productivity, to produce large economic benefits, and to have far reaching effects on 
jobs and employment that will necessitate a rethinking of how we view work. But our knowledge 
of these changes so far, especially as they pertain to Canada and traditional industries such as 
mining, oil and gas, and construction, remains limited. The goal of this study is to understand 
how aware of these new technologies businesses are and how they are responding to or 
planning to respond to them. The findings of this study will be used to inform government 
policy to identify the best way to support businesses through this turbulent transition. 
 
We would like to interview you and/or other people in your organization who are broadly 
familiar with your business’s strategy to hear your opinions on this subject. Participation will 
take between 20 and 30 minutes of your time. Interviews can be conducted either in person or 
over the phone, at your convenience. 
 
This project is being conducted by Aaron Hertes, a graduate student of public policy at the 
Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy in Saskatoon, for a Master’s Thesis. Dr. 




If you are interested in having this conversation, please email Aaron Hertes at 
aaron.hertes@usask.ca to arrange a time and location that would work best for you. This 





Participation in the interview is voluntary, and you can decide to not participate at any time by 
informing the researcher that you no longer wish to proceed. You can withdraw from the 
interview at any time, without giving a reason. In addition, you can decline to answer any 
specific questions with which you are uncomfortable. Declining to answer any particular 
question will not undermine the integrity of the interview. With your permission, the interview 
will be audio recorded. You can have the recording device turned off at any time without giving 
a reason by informing the interviewer. Before the interview begins, you will be explicitly asked 
for consent, which will be recorded on the audio recorder, for the use of audio data for the 
purpose of reporting the study’s findings and for consent to use anonymous quotations. The 
interviews will be conducted in locations that will ensure your privacy such as an office, if the 
interview is done in person, or in a room at Johnson Shoyama Graduate School set aside for such 
interviews if done over the phone. After your interview, and prior to the data being included in 
the final report or any publications, you will be given the opportunity to review the transcript of 
your interview, and to add, alter, or delete information from the transcripts as you see fit.  
 
Your confidentiality will be ensured through the anonymization of interview transcripts in which 
all identifying information will be removed. Participants’ transcripts will be assigned an 
identification number in place of information related to the participant. A master key connecting 
the identification numbers to their corresponding participants will be kept in a locked cabinet 
accessible only to Aaron Hertes to allow the researchers to contact participants to give them the 
opportunity to review their transcripted interviews and proposed anonymous quotations. 
Participants will have two weeks to review and revise their transcripts and the proposed 
quotations, and to grant permission for use. If participants do not return the transcript revisions to 
the interviewer, the transcript will be assumed to be accurate and will be used as such. However, 
explicit permission to use anonymous quotations will be required for them to be included in the 
publication. If the consent to use anonymous quotations is granted, these data will be used only 
for the purposes associated with publications, and/or sharing with other researchers. Your right 
to withdraw data from the study will apply until June 30th, 2020. After this date the master key 
will be destroyed and it will not be possible to withdraw your data.  
 
Risks and Benefits: 
There are no known or anticipated risks from participation in this study including risks to 
relationships with your employer or fellow employees.  Also, there are no direct benefits to you 
for participating in this research. However, the results of this research will help to improve or put 
in place policies that your business may find beneficial. An industry report will be prepared and 
provided to participants upon completion of the project so that you are aware of any findings and 
recommendations arising from the study. 
 
Confidentiality and Data Security: 
All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not appear in 
any publication resulting from this study; however, with your permission anonymous quotations 
may be used. In these cases, participants will be referred to as Participant 1, Participant 2, etc.; 
all identifying information such as the business name will be removed with the exception of the 
industry to which the business belongs as differentiating between industries is a key part of the 
study. The Social Science Research Laboratory at the University of Saskatchewan will 
transcribe and anonymize the recordings. However, with the goal of contacting you later 
and asking for your permission to use anonymous quotations, a master list will be created 




in possession of this master list, which will be stored in a locked cabinet. Transcripts will be 
stored on the University of Saskatchewan One Drive and shared only with Peter Phillips; 
consent records and emails will be stored on the University of Saskatchewan Cabinet 
server separate from the master list and the transcripts to ensure they cannot be connected 
to your data. Once Aaron’s program of studies is complete, Peter Phillips will assume 
possession and responsibility for the data and research materials. The master list will be 
destroyed on June 30th. No one outside of the research team will have access to this information. 
You will not be able to be identified in any way. The data will be stored for five years, post 
publication, on a University of Saskatchewan password-protected computer. After the required 




Contact Information and Research Ethics Clearance 
If you have any questions about participation or would like additional information to assist you 
in reaching a decision about participation, please contact Aaron Hertes via email at 
aaron.hertes@usask.ca.  
 
This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioural Research Ethics Board (BEH ID 1582).  Any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant may be addressed to that committee through the Research Ethics Office 
ethics.office@usask.ca (306) 966-2975. Out of town participants may call toll free (888) 966-
2975. 
 
Thank you for your assistance in this project. Please do not hesitate to contact Aaron Hertes for 




Peter W. B. Phillips, peter.phillips@usask.ca 







Transcript and Quotation Release Form 
 
I have had the opportunity to review and edit my interview transcript and confirm that it 
accurately reflects my statements to the interviewer. 
 
____________________________________                              _Aaron 
Hertes________________________ 
Participant Name                                                                              Interviewer Name 
 
____________________________________                             
____________________________________ 
Signature                                                                                            Signature 
 
____________________________________                             
____________________________________  
Date                                                                                                    Date 
 
 
I have had the opportunity to review and edit the quotations proposed by the interviewer and 
confirm that they accurately reflects my statements to the interviewer. I grant permission for 
these quotations to be used anonymously for the research publication and to be shared with other 
researchers.  
 
____________________________________                              _Aaron 
Hertes________________________ 
Participant Name                                                                              Interviewer Name 
 
____________________________________                             
____________________________________ 
Signature                                                                                            Signature 
 
____________________________________                             
____________________________________  






Original Interview Questions 
 
 Drawing interview questions directly from these categories would result in an interview 
that is impossibly long. Instead, respondents will be asked general questions such as what their 
firm does, how it does it, what the business environment is like, what changes are currently taking 
place in that environment and what they are doing to respond to those changes, what technologies 
are emerging in their industry and how they plan to respond, and their perceptions of the usefulness 
of current innovation policies to their business. Sub-questions under each of these areas will 
explore themes such as firm structure and business strategy, specific instances of innovation, etc. 
as the opportunity presents itself. I am conscious that different respondents will have different 
interpretations of these questions and will therefore tailor them to the specific circumstances of the 
interview. 
 
1. Can you tell me about your firm? 
a. What does it do? 
b. How does it do it? 
c. How big is it? (e.g. how many employees, revenue) 
d. How long has it been in operation? 
2. What is the business environment like? 
a. How many competitors? 
b. Intensity of competition? 
3. What changes are currently taking place in the environment? 
a. What sorts of technologies are emerging in your industry? 
b. What is your firm doing to respond to these changes? 
c. Where did these ideas come from? 
d. What sorts of challenges are you facing/anticipating? 
4. What strategy will you pursue going into the future? 
a. How are you going to make more money? 
b. What sorts of challenges do you expect to face? 
5. How useful does your firm find current innovation policies? 
a. What about other government policies? 
b. What would you recommend to improve them? 
 
